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The Hundred-Years War: The Ongoing 
Battle Between Courts and Agencies over the 
Right to Interpret Federal Law 
Nancy M Modesitt l 
Since the Supreme Court's 1984 Chevron decision, the primary 
responsibility for interpreting federal statutes has increasingly resided with 
federal agencies in the first instance rather than with the federal courts. In 
2005, the Court reinforced this approach by deciding National Telecommu-
nications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, which legitimized the agency 
practice of interpreting federal statutes in a manner contrary to the federal 
courts' established interpretation, so long as the agency interpretation is 
entitled to deference under the well-established Chevron standard. In es-
sence, agencies are free to disregard federal court precedent in these cir-
cumstances. This Article analyzes the question left unanswered by Brand X -
specifically, whether agencies can also ignore federal court interpretations of 
federal statutes when the agency's interpretation is not entitled to Chevron 
deference - and argues, based on consideration of constitutional theory and 
practical repercussions, that agencies may only do so in extremely limited 
circumstances where there is substantial justification. This Article reviews 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's policy of ignoring federal 
precedent in order to illustrate the damage caused by an unjustified policy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For much of the last century, there has been an ongoing battle between 
federal courts and agencies over the right to interpret federal statutes.2 At 
times, courts have deferred to agencies' interpretations. At other times, 
courts have demanded that agencies follow court interpretations. In some 
instances, this has resulted in the development of two distinct bodies of law 
interpreting federal statues: one created by federal courts and another by fed-
eral agencies. 
For example, imagine Susan Smith, a woman subjected to sexual ha-
rassment while working for the federal government who suffers severe emo-
tional distress as a result of the sexual harassment. She is entitled to damages 
for her emotional distress, but the damages award is determined by compar-
ing her symptoms to the symptoms of other employees in other employment 
discrimination cases and is limited by the amounts awarded in those earlier 
cases - not on the merits of Susan's own claim.3 However, if Susan were to 
work for a private employer in Virginia, her emotional distress damages 
would not be limited to an award comparable to those in earlier cases; in-
stead, the amount would be determined by the factfmder with very little limi-
tation.4 The reason for the difference is that a federal agency has announced 
one method of calculating emotional distress damages, using other cases as a 
benchmark for awards, while the Fourth Circuit has taken a completely dif-
ferent approach of evaluating each case on its merits. 5 This is despite the fact 
that the right to emotional distress damages is the same for public and private 
employees.6 
2. See, e.g., JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 123 (1938); Richard 
B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1669, 1681 (1975); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative 
State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (1985). For a history of the rise of the regulatory state, 
see Robert Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
1189(1986). 
3. See Torres v. Chertoff, E.E.O.C. Dec. 0120064872, 2008 WL 2168134 (May 
12,2008). 
4. See Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 180 (4th Cir. 2001). 
5. Compare Torres, 2008 WL 2168134, at *4 (noting that "the Commission 
strives to make damage awards for emotional harm consistent with awards in similar 
cases" in evaluating emotional distress damages awarded), with Fox, 247 F.3d at 180 
(noting that emotional distress awards are "subjective" in nature and require the eval-
uation of the demeanor of the witnesses, a role that the jury (trier of fact) is best 
equipped to provide). 
6. The statutory provision authorizing compensatory damages in this situation 
states that "[i]n an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 [employ-
ment discrimination by private employers] or 717 [employment discrimination by the 
federal government] against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional dis-
crimination ... , the complaining party may recover compensatory ... damages .... " 
42 U.S.c. § 1981a(a)(1)(2006). 
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The development of these different bodies of law, with different legal 
rules, is an exemplar of the results of this ongoing war between federal courts 
and federal agencies over which entity has the primary authority to interpret 
federal statutes. Fairly recently, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a significant 
victory in this war to agencies. In National Cable & Telecommunications 
Ass'n v. Brand X internet Services,7 the Court held that, where an agency's 
interpretation of law is entitled to deference under the well-established Chev-
ron
8 
standard,9 a federal court of appeals' interpretation is not entitled to 
trump the agency's interpretation based on stare decisis. I 0 Rather, the agency 
interpretation is entitled to court deference so long as it meets the standards 
established in Chevron. I I 
However, for the thousands of agency actions and interpretations of law 
not entitled to Chevron deference,12 it has yet to be determined which gov-
ernmental body - federal court of appeals or agency - is the final arbiter of 
federal law. At least one federal agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), has taken the position that it need not even consider 
federal court of appeals precedent, much less defer to it. 13 This Article posits 
that a wholesale refusal to defer to federal court of appeals precedent, exem-
plified in the EEOC policy, is improper where the agency is not entitled to 
Chevron deference. Instead, an agency should provide a significant and sub-
7. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
8. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Oef. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
9. Under Chevron, where a statute is ambiguous and an agency determines its 
meaning, such interpretation is entitled to deference by the courts unless is it arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
lO. 545 U.S. at 982-83. 
11. Id. at 983-84. 
12. This is not an exaggeration. While there are thousands of agency rules, regu-
lations, interpretive guidances, and other legal decisions issued annually, the Supreme 
Court's decisions have limited Chevron deference to agency action undertaken in a 
more formal manner and where the agency has been delegated the authority to speak 
with the force of law, see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), and 
numerous decisions have refused to grant Chevron deference to agency action in 
recent years. See Linda Jellum, Chevron's Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infan-
cy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 725, 772-73 (2007) (arguing that the trend has 
been away from granting Chevron deference); Stephen M. Johnson, Bringing Def-
erence Back (But for How Long?): Justice Alito, Chevron, Auer, and Chenery in the 
Supreme Court's 2006 Term, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2007) (positing that this trend is 
reversing). 
13. See EEOC ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES' HANDBOOK, ch. 2, § III (2002), availa-
ble at http://eeoc.gov/federal/ajhandbook.htrnl#official [hereinafter EEOC 
HANDBOOK] (articulating that administrative judges must use Commission precedent 
rather than federal court precedent); Montemorra v. Snow, No. 01A41536, 2005 WL 
1936122, at *3 n.4 (E.E.O.C. Admin. Ct. Aug. 2, 2005) (noting that the EEOC con-
siders court of appeals decisions to be nonbinding). 
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stantial justification for each decision not to defer to decisions issued by the 
federal courts of appeal. 
Part II explains the historical development of agency nonacquiescence, 
which is the term used to describe an agency's decision not to follow federal 
court of appeals decisions 14 and concludes with a discussion of the Brand X 
decision. Part III proposes a rubric for analyzing agency nonacquiescence 
where Chevron deference is not owed. Part IV analyzes the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission nonacquiescence policy, using this proposed 
rubric to illustrate some of the significant problems created by an agency's 
nonacquiescence policy. This Article concludes that the EEOC's policy is 
inappropriate for a variety of reasons, including reasons based on an empiri-
cal review of EEOC decisions made pursuant to the policy. 
II. THE HISTORY AND TYPES OF NONACQUIESCENCE 
Nonacquiescence is the refusal of agencies to follow federal court of ap-
peals decisions interpreting federal law. Nonacquiescence is one aspect of 
the broader issue of the appropriate relationship between the federal judiciary 
and agencies, specifically, which branch of the government is or should be 
the primary interpreter of federal statutes. In order to understand the more 
specific nonacquiescence issue, a brief summary of the battle between courts 
and agencies over the general right to interpret federal statutes is necessary. 
A. The Struggle to Define the General Standard for Court Review of 
Agency Interpretations of Federal Statutes 
In a perfect world, the relationship between judiciary and agency would 
be established by the Constitution. Unfortunately, while the Constitution 
provides details on the relationship among the federal judiciary, Congress, 
and the President, it does not directly address the relationship between the 
federal judiciary and federal agencies. While generally residing within the 
purview of the Executive Branch, agencies also have roots in Congress, 
which legislatively creates their mandates and can control the scope of their 
power and authority. In addition, many agencies have a quasi-judicial role, 
deciding disputes that might otherwise be heard by the federal courts. As a 
result, agencies, the so-called "fourth branch" of the government, occupy a 
constitutionally uncertain position with respect to the other branches of gov-
ernment. 15 
14. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 98 YALE L. J. 679, 681 (1989). 
15. Peter Strauss's article, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of 
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 575-80 (1984), provides an 
excellent overview of the uncertain position that agencies occupy in the federal con-
stitutional structure. 
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Scholars have long noted the tension between courts and agencies as to 
who has the ultimate authority to determine what the law is: courts, according 
to the oft-repeated language in Marbury v. Madison that it is for the courts to 
"say what the law is," or agencies, according to a "counter-Marbury" prin-
ciple. 16 The pedigree of the former position can be traced back even beyond 
Marbury itself to the Federalist Papers, which noted that "[t]he interpretation 
of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courtS."I? 
Agencies' unclear relationship with the judiciary was not an issue before 
the New Deal because of the manner in which agencies operated and the 
posture in which cases came before the courts. IS Agencies did not take ac-
tions to interpret statutes in a manner that would lead to legal challenges be-
ing brought directly against the Executive Branch; this left the judiciary with 
the exclusive role of interpreter of federal statutes. 19 In addition, the relative-
ly small scale of administrative action before the New Deal and the concomi-
tant rise of the regulatory state made the issue far less pressing a century ago 
than it is today. 
As the modern regulatory state developed, the question of the appropri-
ate relationship between judiciary and agency, with its newly developed pow-
ers, became acute, and the need for answers grew. One potential articulation 
of the agency-judiciary relationship surfaced in the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA), enacted in 1946. One of the APA's provisions appeared to place 
all authority for interpreting federal law with the judiciary, stating that "[a] 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, and interpret con-
stitutional and statutory provisions .... ,,20 This language suggested that the 
judiciary should occupy the premier position with respect to interpreting the 
law. 
However, this language did not affect the Supreme Court's analysis of 
the agency-judiciary relationship. Instead, the Court began its own decades-
long search for defming principles and rules to determine the appropriate 
agency-judiciary relationship. Other scholars have detailed much of this his-
tory;21 for the purposes of this Article, a few examples of the Supreme 
16. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. 
REv. 2071, 2074-75 (1990) (coining the tenn "counter-Marbury") [hereinafter, Suns-
tein [Chevron]]; Richard W. Murphy, A "New" Counter-Marbury: Reconciling 
Skidmore Deference and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 2-4 
(2004) (discussing the subsequent development of "counter-Marbury" principles by 
the U.S. Supreme Court). 
17. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
18. See Sunstein [Chevron], supra note 16, at 2078-79. 
19. /d. 
20. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). 
21. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 2 (discussing, in part, the Supreme Court's vacil-
lating approach to the judicial-agency relationships, focusing on decisions involving 
both constitutional and statutory interpretation). 
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Court's decisions in this area provide a sufficient sense of the confusion per-
meating the issue. 
One early approach, the Skidmore standard, was to deny giving adminis-
trative interpretations of law mandatory authority but to give the administra-
tive interpretation some persuasive authority.22 In Skidmore, the Court inter-
preted the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in order to de-
termine whether time employees spent on call was working time for which 
compensation was required?3 The district court concluded as a matter of law 
that on-call time was not working time.24 The Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that such a conclusion was inappropriate.25 A primary support for its 
conclusion was the district court's failure to consider the guidance provided 
by the congressionally created Office of the Administrator.26 The Adminis-
trator had issued interpretations of the FLSA and concluded that a per se ap-
proach to on-call time was inappropriate; instead, each case should be eval-
uated on its facts in order to determine whether the time should be treated as 
working tirne.27 In discussing the appropriate weight to give to the Adminis-
trator's guidance, the Court stated that it should be determined by considering 
"the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those 
factors which give it power to persuade, iflacking power to control.,,28 
Interpreting the FLSA in another case decided the same year as Skid-
more, the Court in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Producti9 took a different 
approach. In a case involving the Administrator's interpretation of the term 
"area of production" under the FLSA, the Court engaged in a lengthy discus-
sion of the scope of the congressional grant of authority to the Administrator 
and ultimately determined that the Administrator's defmition was improper.3o 
The standard used to gauge the legality of the Administrator's decision was 
not that found in Skidmore.3 ! Instead, the Court engaged in its own interpre-
tation of the statute and determined that the Administrator's defmition was 
inconsistent with the text and purpose of the statute.32 
A little over a decade later, the Supreme Court was faced with a chal-
lenge to the new definition of "area of production" promulgated by the Ad-
ministrator under the FLSA in Mitchell v. Budd. 33 The specific issue was 
22. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
23. See generally id. 
24. ld. at 136. 
25. ld. at 140. 
26.ld. 
27. /d. at 139-40. 
28. /d. at 140. 
29. 322 U.S. 607 (1944). 
30. /d. at 615-16. 
31. /d. 
32.1d. at 613-16. 
33. 350 U.S. 473 (1956). 
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whether employees who were working in an agricultural processing plant 
were working within an "area of production" sufficiently close to the location 
where the agricultural product was grown such that they were exempt from 
the FLSA's provisions.34 The court of appeals held that the regulation 
created by the Administrator, which defined the term, was invalid.35 The 
Supreme Court reversed.36 But, instead of referring to the Skidmore standard 
or discussing in detail whether the new definition comported with the Court's 
interpretation of the statute (the approach taken in Holly Hill), the Court 
simply noted that the Administrator had created a "reasoned definition" of the 
term.37 
These three cases, all involving the same statute and all taking different 
approaches to the analysis of agency interpretations of law, illustrate the un-
certainty the courts had as to the appropriate relationship between agency and 
judiciary. The Supreme Court did not try to explain its reasons for taking 
different approaches or even acknowledge that different approaches were 
being used. And the approaches taken in the above cases were not the only 
ones the federal courts used as the modern regulatory state was established 
and expanded. At times, the Supreme Court has referred to giving agency 
interpretations of federal statutes "great deference,,,38 while on other occa-
sions the Court has appeared to limit this authority by noting that, while defe-
rence was due, "courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construc-
tion.,,39 Lower federal courts also sometimes scrutinized agency actions 
closely, perhaps as a result of the perception of unchecked authority of ad-
ministrative agencies.4o Inconsistency appeared to be the order of the day. 
Then, in 1984, it appeared that the Supreme Court would finally provide 
clarity on the issue when it decided Chevron v. National Resources Defense 
Council.41 In Chevron, the Court was faced with a challenge to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's (EPA) interpretation of the statutory term "sta-
tionary source.'.42 The EPA had defmed the term to provide that all the emit-
ting sources, such as smokestacks, within one facility were a single source 
(the "bubble" rule), and the Court upheld the definition.43 In so doing, the 
34. Id. at 476-77. 
35. Id. at 477. 
36. Id. at 482. 
37. Id. at 480. For a thorough discussion of the Supreme Court's use of a rea-
sonableness standard, see Sunstein [Chevron], supra note 16, at 2081-82. 
38. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. I, 16 (1965). 
39. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 
27,32 (1981). 
40. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1679-81 (discussing the development of greater scrutiny of 
agency action in the decades following the passage of the APA). 
41. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
42. Id. at 840. 
43. Id. at 840, 866. 
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Court articulated a new approach that established parameters for the agency-
judiciary relationship. While still stating that "the judiciary is the fmal au-
thority on issues of statutory construction,'M the Court went on to hold that 
(1) where a statute is ambiguous, it is for the agency to determine its meaning 
in the first instance, and (2) such interpretation must receive deference by the 
courts unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the sta-
tute.',45 
In the years following Chevron, it became clear that the case was the 
touchstone of analysis for agency interpretations of law.46 One of the more 
significant questions that arose after it was decided was how to determine 
whether Chevron applies; that is, under what circumstances should the two-
part standard be used?47 Did the Chevron approach apply to all situations 
where courts were reviewing agency interpretations of federal statutes? 
When it became clear that it did not always apply, the question was then what 
standard applied in the absence of Chevron. Over time, the Supreme Court 
provided guidance on these questions, and, while the law remains uncertain,48 
it appears that the analysis proceeds as follows. 
The degree of deference the federal courts give to interpretations of law 
by agencies depends on agency power and the context of the agency's inter-
pretation. Agencies charged by Congress with authority to speak with the 
force of law, most commonly by engaging in rulemaking, are entitled to 
greater deference in their interpretations of that law than agencies without 
rulemaking authority.49 Where Congress grants an agency the authority to 
create rules with the force of law, courts defer to agency interpretations of 
statutes for which the agency enjoys such authority if the statute is ambig-
uous, as long as the interpretation is reasonable, using the approach outlined 
44. Id. at 843 n.9. 
45. Id. at 844. 
46. Two indications of the importance of Chevron are the number of times it has 
been cited by the courts and the number of scholarly articles written about it. As for 
the former, Cass Sunstein noted in 2006 that Chevron had been cited many thousand 
times by the courts, while, in 2008, Michael Pappas noted that several thousand law 
review articles had also cited it. See Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. 
REv. 187, 188 n.1 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein [Step Zero]]; Michael Pappas, No 
Two-Stepping in the Laboratories: State Deference Standards and Their Implications 
for Improving the Chevron Doctrine, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 977,978 n.5 (2008). 
47. See Sunstein [Step Zero], supra note 46, at 191 (noting that the "most impor-
tant" question as to Chevron has been determining when the framework applies at 
all); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 
836 (2001) (coining the term "Chevron Step Zero" to capture this inquiry). 
48. See Sunstein [Step Zero], supra note 46, at 191 (discussing the ongoing con-
fusion over determining when Chevron applies). 
49. See E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,226-27 (2001); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 
587 (2000). 
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in Chevron.5o If Congress has not granted an agency rulemaking authority, at 
most the courts treat the agency's position as merely persuasive, not control-
ling, under the standard announced in Skidmore v. Swift & CO. 51 Under this 
approach, the agency's interpretation is entitled to some consideration by the 
COurtS.52 How much weight to give to the interpretation depends on "the thor-
oughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, 
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.,,53 
In addition to the congressional grant of rulemaking authority to the 
agency, the degree of deference a court grants to an agency interpretation of 
law also depends on the manner in which the agency reached its decision. 
Decisions made in a formal notice and comment rule making are more likely 
to be analyzed under the Chevron deference standard than decisions made in 
more informal contexts such as policy statements. 54 The rationale for this is 
that a more formal decision-making process "foster[ s] the fairness and delib-
eration that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.,,55 
B. The Slow Realization of the Nonacquiescence Problem 
While Chevron and its progeny provided some answers to the general 
relationship between agencies and courts and whether courts should defer to 
agency interpretations of federal statutes in some contexts, they did not ad-
dress the question of what to do when federal courts of appeals interpreted a 
federal statute and reached an interpretation at odds with an interpretation of a 
federal agency. Would the federal agency be bound by this interpretation in 
the future? This is the nonacquiescence question. 
To clarify the analysis of the propriety of agency nonacquiescence, 
scholars have identified several different categories of nonacquiescence: (1) 
intercircuit nonacquiescence, where an agency refuses to defer to one circuit 
court of appeals' interpretation of law, but the refusal occurs in a case that 
would ultimately be heard in a different circuit; (2) intracircuit nonacquies-
cence, where an agency refuses to defer to a court of appeals' interpretation 
of law, and the case is one that will ultimately be heard in that circuit; and (3) 
venue choice nonacquiescence, where an agency refuses to defer to a court of 
50.467 U.S. 837,844 (1984). 
51. 323 U.S. 134(1944). 
52.Id. 
53.Id. at 140. 
54. See Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 232-34 (2001) (discussing the importance of the 
process by which an agency reaches its interpretation); Robert M. Levin, A Blacklet-
ter Statement of Federal Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 1,38-39 (2002). 
55. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230. In exceptional cases, the importance of the legal 
question presented within the statutory scheme may also play a role in determining 
whether Chevron deference applies. See, e.g., Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,159 (2000). 
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appeals' interpretation of law, but the case may ultimately be brought in a 
different circuit due to flexibility of venue provisions. 56 Of these, the only 
type of nonacquiescence that poses vexing problems is intracircuit nonac-
quiescence, which is what the term "nonacquiescence" refers to in this Ar-
ticle. 57 
While scholars debated the questions of the general relationship between 
agency and court both before and after Chevron, very little attention was paid 
to the narrower question of nonacquiescence. It was not until a much-
publicized situation in the 1980s that the problem surfaced openly. There, the 
Social Security Administration (SSA) was taken to task by courts and scho-
lars for its open refusal to follow lower federal court interpretations of the 
Social Security Act. 58 A flurry of scholarly and practitioner analysis of non-
acquiescence occurred during this time.59 However, no resolution of the issue 
was reached. Scholars failed to agree on the appropriate manner of resolving 
the issue.6o Congress considered a legislative remedy in the SSA context but 
also failed to take a stance, apparently conceding the floor to the courtS.61 In 
56. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 14, at 687 (identifying these categories 
of nonacquiescence). A fourth type of nonacquiescence has been suggested by Ross 
E. Davies in his article, Remedial Nonacquiescence, 89 IOWA L. REV. 65, 81 (2003), 
but such nonacquiescence arises only in a very limited context that is not relevant to 
this Article. 
57. See Johnson v. U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd., 969 F.2d 1082, 1091 (1992) (not-
ing the potential constitutional problems posed by intracircuit nonacquiescence); 
Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 14, at 718-25; Carolyn Kubitschek, Social Security 
Administration Nonacquiescence: The Need for Legislative Curbs on Agency Discre-
tion, 29 Soc. SECURITY REPORTING SERVICE 627 (May 1990); Robert 1. Axelrod, The 
Politics of Nonacquiescence: The Legacy ofSteiberger v. Sullivan, 60 BROOKLYN L. 
REV. 765, 770 nn.28-29 (1994). 
58. See, e.g., Steiberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Kubit-
schek, supra note 57; Axelrod, supra note 57. 
59. See, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 14; Matthew Diller & Nancy Mo-
rawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Re-
sponse to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE LJ. 801 (1990); Samuel Figler, Executive 
Agency Nonacquiescence to Judicial Opinions, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1664, 1668 
(1993); Kubitscheck, supra note 57; Steve Y. Koh, Nonacquiescence in Immigration 
Decisions of the u.s. Courts of Appeals, 9 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 430 (1991); Axe-
lrod, supra note 57. 
60. See generally Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 14, at 683-84,735 (suggesting 
that intercircuit nonacquiescence is always acceptable, while intracircuit nonacquies-
cence is frequently justified); Diller & Morawetz, supra note 59 (condemning intra-
circuit nonacquiescence); Rebecca Hanner White, Time for a New Approach: Why the 
Judiciary Should Disregard the "Law of the Circuit" When Confronting Nonacquies-
cence by the National Labor Relations Board, 69 N.C. L. REV. 639 (1991) (arguing 
that nonacquiescence is justified as to the NLRB). 
61. The House and Senate had slightly different approaches to banning nonac-
quiescence, and, in the process of crafting a legislative compromise on other issues, 
the nonacquiescence language was dropped from the bills. See Dan T. Coenen, The 
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various different contexts, the federal courts also failed to expressly forbid 
agencies to engage in the practice;62 however, in both the SSA context and 
elsewhere, the lower federal courts began condemning some types of nonac-
. 63 qUIescence. 
After the Social Security situation subsided, the Supreme Court took up 
its ftrst case that, at least indirectly, appeared to provide some guidance on 
the nonacquiescence issue. In Maislin Industries u.s., Inc. v. Primary Steel, 
Inc.,64 the Court grappled with a situation where earlier Supreme Court inter-
pretations of the Interstate Commerce Act conflicted with the current Inter-
state Commerce Commission's (ICC) interpretation of the Act. In other 
words, the ICC was refusing to defer to the Supreme Court's existing 
precedent. Faced with this conflict, the Court stated that, "[0 ]nce we have 
determined a statute's clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under 
the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency's later interpretation of 
the statute against our prior detennination of the statute's meaning.,,65 
The Supreme Court reafftnned this approach two years later in Lech-
mere, Inc. v. NLRB.66 There, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
had interpreted section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act to allow union 
organizers to distribute union literature on company property despite the 
company's policy prohibiting solicitation on the premises if, based on a mul-
ti-factor balancing test, the union could establish its need to do SO.67 This 
conflicted with the Court's decisions holding that a prerequisite for allowing 
non-employee union organizers to trespass on company property was that 
there was no reasonable access to employees off of company property and 
that the balancing test only applied after this prerequisite was established.68 
Citing Maislin, the Court noted that, if it had already determined the Act's 
clear meaning, an inconsistent interpretation by the NLRB would be fore-
Constitutional Case Against lntracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1339, 
1377-81 (discussing congressional inaction in the SSA nonacquiescence debate). 
62. See, e.g., Axelrod, supra note 57, at 766-68 (explaining how the Second 
Circuit appeared to initially forbid the Social Security Administration's nonacquies-
cence policy but later backed away from that approach); Koh, supra note 59, at 447-
49 (outlining the federal courts' conflicting statements about nonacquiescence by the 
Immigration & Naturalization Service, ranging from acceptance to condemnation). 
63. See, e.g., Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1438 (9th CiT. 1983); Keasler v. 
United States, 766 F.2d 1227, 1233 (8th CiT. 1985). As the D.C. Circuit noted in 
Johnson v. u.s. Railroad Retirement Board, 969 F.2d \082, \091 (D.C. CiT. 1992), 
"[i]ntracircuit nonacquiescence has been condemned by almost every circuit court of 
appeals that has confronted it." (citations omitted). 
64.497 U.S. 116 (1990). 
65.ld. at 131. 
66. 502 U.S. 527 (1992). 
67.ld. at 536. 
68.1d. at 538 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205 
(1978)); Cent. Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 545 (1972). 
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closed.69 The Court went on to hold that the NLRB's interpretation was im-
permissible because it was indeed inconsistent with the Court's previous in-
terpretation of the Act. 70 
Just a few years later, in Neal v. United States/1 the Court again faced a 
conflict between an agency's interpretation of the law and its own precedent 
and once again determined that its own interpretation took precedence over 
that of the agency.72 In Neal, the question was whether the Supreme Court's 
decision in Chapman v. United State/3 required use of the actual weight of 
blotter paper to determine the quantity of LSD for sentencing criminal defen-
dants even though the Sentencing Commission had determined that a pre-
sumptive rather than actual weight of the blotting paper should be used.74 
Holding that Chapman would preclude reliance on the Sentencing Commis-
sion's approach, the Court focused heavily on the importance of stare decisis, 
noting that, while the Sentencing Commission was free to change its policy, 
the Court lacked such "latitude.,,75 
In Neal, the Court sidestepped the question of whether Chevron applied 
and suggested that Supreme Court precedent always trumps agency interpre-
tations, regardless of whether deference should be shown to the agency's 
interpretation.76 In Lechmere, the Court reached its decision to trump agency 
interpretation with Court precedent despite suggesting that Chevron deference 
might apply. 77 Taking the cases together, it seemed that stare decisis pro-
vided an exception to the general Chevron deference approach. The open 
question was how far this exception could be pressed - would it apply when 
the agency interpretation conflicted with a lower fedcral court opinion? 
Despite Supreme Court precedent that could be read as foreclosing non-
acquiescence even when Chevron deference was due, many federal agencies 
maintained their position that they need not, and would not, follow federal 
courts of appeals decisions interpreting statutes the agencies are charged with 
adrninistering.78 Some agencies adopted a policy of open nonacquiescence, 
69. Id. at 536-37. 
70. /d. at 538. 
71. 516 U.S. 284 (1996). 
72.Id. at 285-86 (rejecting the U.S. Sentencing Commission's method of calcu-
lating quantity of LSD for purposes of sentencing drug offenses in favor of method 
articulated by the Court in Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991)). 
73.500 U.S. 453 (1991). 
74.516 U.S. at 287-88. 
75. Id. at 295. 
76.Id. 
77. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 536. 
78. See Keasler v. United States, 766 F.2d 1227, 1233 (8th Cir. 1985) (IRS); 
Koh, supra note 59 (discussing the INS); Ekwutozia U. Nwabuzor, Comment, The 
Cry of the Colossus: Discipio v. Ashcroft, Nonacquiescence and Judicial Deference 
in Immigration Law, 50 How. L.J. 575 (2007) (same); Kevin Haskins, Note, A "Deli-
cate Balance": How Agency Nonacquiescence and the EPA's Water Transfer Rule 
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but others acted in a more covert fashion. 79 In the face of this, the federal 
courts of appeals appeared to align generally in one direction - against agen-
. 80 
cy nonacqUIescence. 
Then, in 2005, the Supreme Court finally took up the issue of nonac-
quiescence as to federal courts of appeals decisions when it decided Brand X. 
In that case, the Court held that a federal court of appeals' interpretation of a 
federal statute was not binding on an agency in all circumstances; sometimes, 
the agency was free to reach an interpretation contrary to that of an earlier 
federal court of appeals decision.81 In Brand X, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) had issued a declaratory ruling that internet cable provid-
ers were not telecommunication service providers under the Communications 
Act (as amended in 1996).82 This conflicted with an earlier Ninth Circuit 
decision holding that cable providers were telecommunication service provid-
ers.
83 When the Ninth Circuit was called upon to resolve the conflict between 
the FCC interpretation and its own, it held that it was bound by stare decisis 
to abide by its past decision. 84 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court held that the Ninth 
Circuit's approach was incorrect.85 Rather, the Court determined that (1) the 
FCC's interpretation of the Communications Act was entitled to Chevron 
deference and, (2) because it was entitled to Chevron deference, stare decisis 
must yield to the agency's authority to interpret the law.86 The FCC was 
therefore entitled to reach an interpretation of the law contrary to that of the 
Dilute the Clean Water Act After Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. 
v. City Of New York, 60 ME. L. REV. 173 (2008) (EPA); Peter J. Rooney, Comment, 
Nonacquiescence by the Securities and Exchange Commission: Its Relevance to the 
Nonacquiescence Debate, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1992); White, supra note 60 
(discussing the NLRB). 
79. Compare Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1983) (openly 
acknowledging approach), with Koh, supra note 59, at 436 (discussing INS official 
policy that it does not have a policy of nonacquiescence and noting commonality of 
this approach). One might expect that such policies would be published in the Federal 
Register, but a search of that publication fails to reveal nonacquiescence policies that 
do in fact exist. For example, the Department of the Interior's Board of Land Appeals 
engages in nonacquiescence, but this can only be determined by searching through the 
Board's adjudicatory decisions. See In re Amoco Prod. Co., 144 IBLA 135 (I.B.L.A. 
1998) (noting that the Department of the Interior's Board of Land Appeals occasion-
ally refuses to defer to federal circuit court of appeals decisions). As noted below, the 
EEOC's nonacquiescence policy is equally difficult to locate. See infra Part IV.A. 
80. See sources cited supra note 62. 
81. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
982 (2005). 
82. ld. at 975-78 (discussing the FCC rulemaking process and outcome). 
83. ld. at 979-80. 
84.1d. 
85. ld. at 982. 
86. ld. at 984-86. 
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Ninth Circuit, and the federal courts, including the Ninth Circuit, must defer 
to the agency's interpretation, even over the court's own precedent.8? 
And how did the Court explain Neal, Maislin, and Lechmere? In its de-
cision, the Court explicitly distinguished Neal and implicitly distinguished 
Maislin and Lechmere, based on the fact that, in each of those cases, the prior 
Court decision that the agency did not follow was an interpretation of an un-
ambiguous statute.88 Because the statute was unambiguous, the agency's 
construction of it was not entitled to Chevron deference; thus, the Court's 
prior construction trumped that of the agency pursuant to stare decisis.89 In a 
scathing dissent, Justice Scalia argued that this interpretation of Neal, Mais-
lin, and Lechmere amounted to revisionist history and that the Court's deci-
sion in Brand X created a significant shifting of power, possibly in violation 
of the Constitution, from the judiciary to agencies.9o 
III. THE THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE OVER 
NONACQUIESCENCE IN THE ABSENCE OF CHEVRON DEFERENCE AND 
A PROPOSED RUBRIC 
A. The Theoretical and Philosophical Assessment of Nonacquiescence 
While the Court in Brand X faced a situation where Chevron deference 
was appropriate and thus did not decide the approach to be used when defer-
ence is not appropriate, it did indicate in dictum that federal court precedent 
would be binding on the agency nevertheless. Specifically, the Court noted 
that, in some situations, "the court's prior ruling remains binding law (for 
example, as to agency interpretations to which Chevron is inapplicable).,,91 
While this is a forceful statement, given the number of times the Su-
preme Court has changed its approach to determining whether courts should 
defer to agencies and the ongoing uncertainty as to the scope of Supreme 
Court decisions involving deference to agency interpretations of law,92 rely-
87.1d. 
88. ld. at 984. 
89. !d. 
90. ld. at 1016-18. 
91. See id. at 983. 
92. See Murphy, supra note 16, at 4 (discussing the ongoing confusion as to the 
relationship between courts and agencies and the contribution of inconsistent deci-
sions by the U.S. Supreme Court to this confusion). For example, some scholars, and 
the Ninth Circuit as well, had read Neal to mean that nonacquiescence was improper 
because it violated stare decisis principles. See Brand X Internet Servs. v. F.C.C., 345 
F.3d 1120, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2003) (determining that Neal applied to federal courts of 
appeals decisions as well as Supreme Court decisions); John F. Manning, Recent 
Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 
72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 893, 942 n.234 (2004). The reading of Neal, Maislin, and 
Lechmere that resulted in Brand X was seen by Justice Scalia as being revisionist (and 
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ing on a single nonbinding statement as authority would be foolhardy. What 
then should be the proper analysis of an agency's continuing nonacquiescence 
after Brand X where Chevron deference does not apply? In order to answer 
this question, the underlying philosophical, theoretical, and practical justifica-
tions for agency nonacquiescence must be examined in the specific circums-
tances where Chevron deference is not due. This analysis is critical to deter-
mine whether the justifications continue to provide support for nonacquies-
cence in this context. 
Agency nonacquiescence is sometimes justified under the theory that, 
since Congress delegates to agencies the power to create administrative rules 
with the force of law, agencies' interpretations of law are imbued with con-
gressional authority.93 Thus, in many contexts agency interpretations of law 
are entitled to deference by the courtS.94 In the nonacquiescence debate, 
agencies reason that, since agency interpretations of law are sometimes en-
titled to deference by the courts, it is entirely appropriate for agencies to 
refuse to follow federal court interpretations of law, as this would infringe on 
the agency's authority to interpret the law and issue regulations entitled to 
court deference.95 From a court's perspective, the deference owed to agen-
cies is pitted against the constitutional authority of the courts to "determine 
what the law is" under Marbury v. Madison and, in cases where the courts 
have already spoken, the doctrine of stare decisis. 96 
Where no Chevron deference is due, an agency's nonacquiescence is 
suspect because the underlying justifications for Chevron apply with far less 
force, if any at all. There are two primary theoretical justifications developed 
in Chevron and by scholars to support the determination that deference to an 
agency is appropriate: legislatively delegated authority and separation of 
surprising). See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1016-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling the 
results of Brand X "bizarre"). 
93. This concept derives from the Supreme Court's own enunciation of the 
source of its deference to agencies. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). For a discussion of the general 
concept, see Merrill & Hickman, supra note 47, at 870-72. 
94. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 47. 
95. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in 
Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1301-03 (2002) (arguing that 
requiring agencies to adhere to court precedent "frustrates the very policy justifica-
tions for the administrative state"); Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 14, at 720-21 
(noting that, for any particular agency nonacquiescence decision, the analysis of 
whether it is appropriate under administrative law principles must be made on a case-
by-case basis); Diller & Morawetz, supra note 59, at 818-21 (discussing nonacquies-
cence under Chevron). 
96. For a discussion of the development of this battle between court deference to 
agency interpretations of law and the mandate of stare decisis, see Kathryn A. Watts, 
Adapting to Administrative Law's Erie Doctrine, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 997 (2007); see 
also Bamberger, supra note 95, at 1283-89. 
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powers.97 Legislative delegation of authority focuses on the authority granted 
to the agency from Congress to administer the law.98 The idea is simple: 
where Congress authorized an agency to speak with the force of law, courts 
should respect this delegation of authority and not supplant the agency's in-
terpretations.99 Thus, agencies enjoy an authority superior to that of the 
courts, justifying court deference to the agency and, along with that, agency 
nonacqUIescence. 
Separation of powers theories focus on the appropriate role of agencies 
versus courts within our tripartite system of government. Since the Executive 
Branch, in which agencies nominally lie, is entrusted with making policy 
choices to administer legislation, courts should defer to the politically ac-
countable Executive Branch's policy decisions. lOo Separation of powers ad-
vocates focus on the Court's statement that, 
[w]hile agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the 
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political 
branch of the Government to make such policy choices - resolving 
the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently 
did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency 
97. Merrill & Hickman's article, Chevron's Domain, also articulates a third po-
tential doctrinal basis for deference: that Chevron represents a common law interpre-
tive doctrine. However, the authors dismiss this possibility. See Merrill & Hickman, 
supra note 47, at 868-70. More recently, Evan Criddle argues that there are, in reali-
ty, five core factors that together justify Chevron, including congressional delegation 
and separation of powers, which he denotes as political responsiveness and accounta-
bility. See Evan J. Criddle, Chevron's Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1275 
(2008). Several of the other factors Criddle notes overlap with the practical, not phi-
losophical, justifications for deference that are discussed below. 
98. See Sunstein [Chevron], supra note 16, at 2083-87 ("[a ]ny principles of defe-
rence to administrators must of course depend on congressional instructions, at least 
as a general rule"); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 47, at 870-72 (discussing this as a 
theory of presumed congressional intent). 
99. See Sun stein [Chevron], supra note 16, at 2087 (noting that "if Congress has 
delegated basic implementing authority to the agency, the Chevron approach might 
reflect a belief, attributable to Congress in the absence of a clear contrary legislative 
statement, in the comparative advantages of the agency in making those choices"); 
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 47, at 871-72 (noting also the fiction of congressional 
intent inherent to such a theory). 
100. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 865-66 (1984). Numerous scholars have focused their analysis of Chevron on 
this separation of powers principle. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling 
Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L. J. 2225,2232-33 (1997); Randolph J. May, 
Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58 ADMIN. 
L. REv. 429 (2006) (using separation of powers principles to argue that independent 
agencies should be entitled to less deference than executive agencies). 
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charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday 
realities. 101 
Because of this political accountability, courts should defer to agency inter-
pretations oflaw. I02 
The theory of legislatively delegated authority to an agency cannot, on 
its own, justify an agency's nonacquiescence when that agency is not entitled 
to Chevron deference. The Supreme Court's preliminary inquiry in Brand X 
as to the scope of the congressional delegation of authority to the agency illu-
strates its critical nature. I03 A determination that Chevron deference is not 
owed is, by definition, a determination that Congress has not given the agen-
cy the authority to speak with the force of law as to the interpretation at issue, 
and, thus, the agency's interpretations of law are not made pursuant to an 
explicit delegation of power by Congress. I04 Yet, in many instances where 
rulemaking authority has not been delegated by Congress, the agency still has 
some degree of delegated authority, such as the authority to enforce the stat-
ute. As is seen even where Chevron deference is not due, there is still some 
recognition that the agency's interpretation matters because of the agency's 
congressional mandate - the interpretation simply is not controlling and, thus, 
does not present a sufficient justification on its own for an agency to engage 
. . 105 
m nonacqUIescence. 
The separation of powers theory, entrusting policy decisions inherent in 
the interpretation of law to the politically accountable branch of government, 
may provide some additional support for agency nonacquiescence even where 
Chevron deference is not owed to the agency interpretation. Interpretations 
of law by agencies are policy driven regardless of whether Congress has del-
egated law-making authority to the agency. However, this justification is 
overreaching on its own: all agency action would be entitled to deference 
under this theory, which is inconsistent with Chevron and its progeny. Thus, 
this theory can at most provide some support for agency nonacquiescence in 
the absence of Chevron deference; it does not provide a definitive answer. 
101. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66. 
102. See id.; see also Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance 
of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COWM. L. REv. 452, 456 (1989) (discussing 
and critiquing this theory). 
103. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S 967, 
980-81 (2005). 
104. See Sunstein [Chevron], supra note 16, at 2093 (noting that a "legislative 
grant of rulemaking power implicitly carries with it the grant of authority to interpret 
ambiguities in the law that the agency is entrusted with administering"). 
105. For example, under the Skidmore standard, courts cannot ignore the agency's 
interpretation but must give it some consideration. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holo-
weeki, 128 S. Ct. 1147, 1156 (2008) (noting that agency interpretations under this 
standard are entitled to some respect). 
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Moreover, related separation of powers principles undercut the idea that 
agency nonacquiescence is appropriate where no Chevron deference is owed. 
Part of our concept of separation of powers is that each separate branch of 
government acts as a check on the other branches of government, preventing 
an excessive accrual of power in anyone branch. 106 Agency assumption of 
the power to speak with authority equal to that of the federal courts of appeals 
moves power from the judiciary to the agency, and such a shift should not be 
presumed appropriate in all circumstances. Furthermore, giving agencies 
legislative power as well as primary judicial power of interpretation has the 
potential for an unchecked accrual of authority by the agency. A second se-
paration of powers concern is also potentially present: usurpation of the judi-
cial role to "say what the law is.,,107 While these concerns exist whenever 
courts defer to agency interpretations of law, the concerns are subordinated to 
the expressed (or, at times, implied) congressional delegation of law-making 
authority to the agency. Lacking such a delegation of authority, these con-
cerns should be taken into consideration and suggest that agency nonacquies-
cence requires significant justification. 
B. JustifYing Agency Nonacquiescence: A Cost-Benefit Rubric 
Because of the lack of legislatively delegated authority to speak with the 
force of law and the potentially improper infringement by an agency on the 
authority of the federal courts of appeal, a blanket rule allowing agency non-
acquiescence where no Chevron deference is due is unjustifiable. However, a 
per se ban on agency nonacquiescence seems equally inappropriate. Requir-
ing agencies to adhere to federal court of appeals' interpretations of federal 
106. Some would not consider this an aspect to separation of powers but rather its 
own independent concept. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 15, at 577-78 (describing 
separation of powers as solely referring to the principle that each branch of govern-
ment only exercises the power that is at the core of its operations, while describing 
checks and balances as referring to maintaining). 
107. See id. However, one theory is that separation of powers concerns are min-
imal where Chevron deference is due because of the significant congressional authori-
ty over the lower federal courts. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 14, at 729-31. 
Congress has the power to remove and restrict the jurisdiction of the lower federal 
courts, thereby preventing them from reviewing agency decisions. ld. Because of 
this, where Congress has delegated legislative authority to an agency, this grant of 
authority to the agency can be read as implicitly limiting the authority of the lower 
federal courts over that agency, justifying its nonacquiescence. ld. Congress has the 
ability to prevent the lower and intermediate federal courts from exercising jurisdic-
tion over a matter, and this indicates that Congress can give an agency authority to act 
in the same manner as and with the power equivalent to that of the lower federal 
courts. ld. Therefore, agencies refusing to acquiesce in federal court of appeals in-
terpretations of the law are merely exercising this congressional grant of power. ld. 
There is ample criticism of this position, however. See, e.g., Diller & Morawetz, 
supra note 59, at 823-24; Coenen, supra note 61, at 1373-81. 
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statutes at all times is inconsistent with the political realities facing agen-
cies. \08 Binding the entire agency with a single federal court of appeals deci-
sion has the potential to disrupt significantly the operations of the agency. \09 
Furthermore, circumstances change over time, and the prospect of a lower 
federal court decision binding an agency into perpetuity, or at least until con-
gressional action is taken to legislatively overrule the court interpretation, 
suggests that some flexibility on the part of agencies to engage in nonac-
quiescence is required. I 10 Judges are not infallible, and, where there is sub-
stantial need and justification, agencies should have recourse to nonacquies-
cence.111 
The question, then, is under what circumstances agency nonacquies-
cence is justified, bearing in mind that this inquiry is limited to situations 
where Chevron deference is inappropriate. Justifications for agency nonac-
quiescence typically include (1) creating national uniformity in the interpreta-
tion of the law; (2) promoting percolation; (3) producing better interpretations 
of law due to agency expertise; and (4) administrative efficiency. For the 
reasons that follow, these general justifications are insufficient to support 
agency nonacquiescence where no Chevron deference is due; more is needed. 
As to uniformity, deferring to agency interpretation of law as a means of 
promoting national uniformity is an oft-cited rationale not only for nonac-
quiescence but also as a general benefit of Chevron deference and the regula-
tory state. I 12 While promoting national uniformity is a laudable goal, it is far 
from clear that agency nonacquiescence where no Chevron deference is due 
will lead to national uniformity. While the agency may have a uniform ap-
proach nationwide, there is no guarantee that the courts will adopt the same 
108. For example, changes in circumstances may require a new approach by the 
agency. Requiring agencies to follow a single lower federal court decision in perpetu-
ity would have the potential to ossify the law. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 
218, 247-48 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the undesirability of ossification). 
109. See Pierce, supra note 100, at 2236 (discussing the difficulties of agencies 
constructing coherent programs if required to defer to federal court of appeals deci-
sions). 
110. Indeed, in Chevron the Supreme Court recognized the need for agencies to be 
authorized to change course over time. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984). See Murphy, supra note 16, at 16 
(noting the expectation that agencies will revise their interpretations of the law over 
time). 
111. See Coenen, supra note 61, at 1387. 
112. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 14, at 747-48; Peter Strauss, One Hun-
dred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Re-
sources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1118-29 
(1987); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 47, at 860-61 (noting benefits of uniformity); 
Bamberger, supra note 95, at 1305 (asserting that greater deference to agencies results 
in greater uniformity because federal courts all defer to the agency interpretation 
rather than producing circuit splits where federal courts disagree over the appropriate 
interpretation of the law). 
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approach as the agency. In the absence of Chevron deference, courts cannot 
be compelled to defer to the agency's approach; they would need to do so 
voluntarily, and uniformly, to achieve a single nationwide interpretation of 
the law. The idea that all the federal courts will defer when they are not re-
quired to do so is highly suspect. 113 Indeed, as discussed below in the EEOC 
context, courts may not even be aware of federal agency interpretations of 
law that might be at odds with their own interpretations. Thus, even if many 
federal courts would defer if they were aware of an agency's interpretation, 
there could still be different interpretations of the law reached by lower feder-
al courts and the agency, precluding national uniformity. Given the reality 
that agencies are aware of court action, but not necessarily vice-versa, and 
that courts can compel agency action, but not vice-versa, national uniformity 
in the absence of Chevron deference can only be achieved if agencies ac-
quiesce and thereby defer to federal court decisions. I 14 
The second potential benefit of an agency's nonacquiescence, percola-
tion, requires some explanation. In this context, percolation refers to the 
process in which different interpretations of the law are explored by different 
entities before one uniform interpretation is reached - ideas are "percolating" 
among the entities. 115 In the federal courts, percolation occurs as different 
circuits reach different conclusions about an issue. Because many courts will 
have the opportunity to address the issue, the full implications of various in-
terpretations of the law will be fully developed. Eventually, so the theory 
goes, either all the circuits will ultimately agree on the best approach, having 
seen different options, or the Supreme Court will step in and mandate the best 
approach if the circuits do not agree. As to agencies, the idea is that the 
agency acts as an equal player with authority equivalent to the lower federal 
. hi· 116 courts ill t e perco atlOn process. 
There are two flaws with this argument. First, where no Chevron def-
erence is due, it would be anomalous to treat an agency as having the authori-
ty equivalent to that of a federal court of appeals. If Congress wanted the 
agency to have authority equivalent to the federal courts of appeals to pro-
mote percolation, it would have done so by giving the agency sufficient au-
1l3. See Pierce, supra note 100,2234-35 (noting that the problem of inconsistent 
court-agency interpretations of law was greater before the Chevron deference stan-
dard was articulated). 
114. Even if agencies were to do this, there is still the possibility of multiple ap-
proaches being taken in the lower federal courts until the federal circuits agree on the 
proper interpretation ofthe law. 
115. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 14, at 729 (noting benefits of percola-
tion). 
116. Estreicher and Revesz discuss percolation benefits but do not explicitly artic-
ulate this idea. See id. at 729-30. See also White, supra note 60, at 662 (discussing 
percolation benefits supporting NLRB nonacquiescence). 
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thority to speak with the force of law. 117 Having failed to do so, in order to 
justify an agency's nonacquiescence, there would need to be a significant 
reason to include the agency as a part of the federal court percolation process 
on par with the federal courts of appeals. 
Simply adding one more body, that of the agency, to those who may de-
cide the issue is not a sufficiently compelling rationale. First, it is quite poss-
ible that the agency's position will be presented to the federal courts even if it 
is required to acquiesce, making it a part of the percolation process without 
raising troubling constitutional concerns. I 18 In addition, while more is some-
times better, the marginal difference between twelve decision-making entities 
and thirteen seems slight, unless there is something significant about the addi-
tional decision-making entity. I 19 
It is quite possible that an agency will have a different view of the prop-
er interpretation of a law than the courts due to its different role in the gov-
ernment. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, agencies may have 
special expertise and information unavailable to a court, which could result in 
a better understanding of an issue. 120 Here, the goal of percolation, reaching a 
better ultimate decision, is promoted not so much by adding one more deci-
sion-making body but by the special expertise of the agency, which is also an 
independent argument (the third listed above) in support of agency nonac-
qmescence. 
Sufficient special expertise to justify nonacquiescence should not, how-
ever, be presumed. Agencies all have expertise in the subject matter over 
which they administer. Presuming that all agencies are entitled to ignore 
lower federal court precedent based on their general expertise is inconsistent 
with the concept of a specific delegation of authority needed to require lower 
federal courts to defer to the agency pursuant to Chevron. Instead, agencies 
should be required to prove that they have some specific knowledge or under-
standing of an issue that is unavailable to a court in order to justify the agen-
cy's nonacquiescence where no Chevron deference is due. The more com-
plex the regulatory or statutory scheme, the more likely it is that an agency, 
rather than a court, will appropriately interpret the statute, being better 
equipped to understand the policy implications and balance the repercussions 
of a particular interpretation oflaw over competing ones. 121 
117. This is the natural outgrowth of the "legislatively mandated" deference doc-
trine articulated by Merrill & Hickman. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 47, at 
870-73. 
118. This would occur when the agency issues its interpretation before the federal 
courts have an opportunity to speak on the issue. 
119. The numbers twelve and thirteen refer to federal circuit courts of appeals. 
120. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
845 (1984); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002). 
l2l. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (noting the agency's superior ability to balance 
"conflicting policies"); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 47, at 861-62 (discussing the 
need for deference when an agency administers a complex statutory scheme); Mur-
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A fourth justification for an agency's nonacquiescence policy is admin-
istrative efficiency, that is, the practical need to have a single approach to 
interpretations of the law at the agency.122 Without the nonacquiescence pol-
icy, there is the potential for the agency to be subjected to different interpreta-
tions of law if the different federal circuits lack a common interpretation. 
Also, an agency could be required to become familiar with the different cases 
in every circuit interpreting the law and follow those different interpretations, 
leading to a lack of uniformity within the agency. Of these two problems, the 
lack of uniformity within the agency is the more troubling prospect, as the 
agency may be in the position of having to maintain several different ap-
proaches to one situation at the same time. These problems, at a minimum, 
would make the agency less efficient because it has to research, understand, 
and apply more than one interpretation of the law at any given time. Yet, 
where Congress has not delegated authority to the agency sufficient to entitle 
its interpretations of law to Chevron deference, it should be presumed that 
Congress was aware that the agency would be subject to such situations. 
Thus, there must be some pressing need beyond the typical agency desire for 
uniformity and administrative efficiency to justify the agency's nonacquies-
cence. 
The above considerations focus primarily on the structural justifications 
of agency nonacquiescence. In addition, there should be a substantive justifi-
cation for the agency's decision to engage in nonacquiescence; that is, the 
substance of the agency's interpretation should also be assessed to determine 
whether nonacquiescence is justifiable. An appropriate and familiar frame-
work already exists to conduct this analysis. Where Chevron deference is not 
appropriate, the Supreme Court has sometimes analyzed an agency's interpre-
tation of law according to the standard announced in Skidmore v. Swift & 
CO. 123 The Skidmore framework is appropriate in this context because it is 
the standard likely to be used if, ultimately, the Supreme Court is called upon 
to resolve the continuing dispute between agency and lower federal court 
interpretations of law. Under this approach, the agency's interpretation is 
entitled to some consideration by the courtS. 124 If the agency's interpretation 
would not survive court review under the Skidmore standard, then it would be 
phy, supra note 16, at 24 (arguing that the greater the agency's expertise, the stronger 
its claim is for deference from the courts); Bamberger, supra note 95, at 1305 (opin-
ing that the need for deference is greatest with a complex statutory scheme). 
122. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 14, at 743-44; Coenen, supra note 61, at 
1414; Diller & Morawetz, supra note 59, at 813-14. 
123.323 U.S. 134 (1944). Katherine Watts also recommends use of the Skidmore 
framework in a somewhat similar context and advocates reading Skidmore in a man-
ner such that the courts are compelled to give some consideration to the agency's 
interpretation of the statute. See Watts, supra note 96, at 1041-47. 
124. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147, 1156 (2008) (noting 
that agency interpretations under this standard are entitled to some respect). 
972 MISSOURI LA W REVIEW [Vol. 74 
futile to engage in nonacquiescence, as the interpretation would ultimately be 
doomed to failure. 
In addition to an agency being required to specifically justify its need to 
engage in nonacquiescence by identifying the benefits it will achieve and the 
substantive appropriateness of its interpretation, these benefits must outweigh 
the costs of the nonacquiescence in order to justify it. Where Chevron def-
erence is required, the costs of agency nonacquiescence can be presumed to 
have been expected by Congress. Without Chevron deference, this presump-
tion is inappropriate, and a cost-benefit analysis must justify the nonacquies-
cence. 
The costs of nonacquiescence may fall on the parties subject to agency 
regulation, the agency, and third parties. There may also be negative reper-
cussions for the administrative system. A common type of cost to be consid-
ered is the cost of potential inconsistency of result in any specific case caused 
by the agency's nonacquiescence. For example, when the SSA engaged in 
nonacquiescence in the 1980s, the result was that individuals were subjected 
to two different interpretations of law: one at the agency level, where the SSA 
used its interpretation, and a second in the lower federal courts, which had 
their own interpretations of the law. Litigants could only obtain the benefit of 
the federal court interpretation if they persevered and appealed the agency 
decision. This imposed costs on both litigants and the courts. 
In addition to the potential problem of this inconsistency of result as to 
anyone party, and the concomitant cost to the litigant to obtain a federal 
court review, consideration should be given to the burdens or costs imposed 
on third parties. Agency action can affect non-litigants, as rules imposed by 
agencies are noted and may be followed by those who may be subject to the 
agency's interpretation in the future, such as in an enforcement action. 
Looking beyond the costs and benefits to the agency, parties, and those 
who follow the agency's rule because they may be subject to the agency's 
jurisdiction in the future, consideration should also be given to the context in 
which the agency's interpretation is made. 125 For example, in situations in-
volving either agency capture or the repeat player phenomenon - that is, situ-
ations where an agency is unduly influenced by those it regulates and those 
with whom it has many interactions - the agency's nonacquiescence is inap-
propriate, as the agency's interpretation of law may reflect bias. 126 In addi-
125. Focusing on the context of an agency's action is consistent with the Supreme 
Court's jurisprudence in this area. In Mead, the Court noted that, in addition to the 
congressional grant of authority to the agency, the degree of deference a court grants 
to an agency's interpretation of law also depends on the manner in which the agency 
reached its decision. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,229-31 (2001). 
Decisions made in a formal notice and comment rulemaking process are generally 
given greater deference than decisions made in more informal contexts, such as policy 
statements. Id. 
126. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 421, 448-50 (1987) [hereinafter Sunstein [Constitutionalism]); Richard B. Ste-
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tion, the inability to police an agency effectively may suggest that the agency 
should defer to court interpretations rather than engaging in nonacquies-
cence.
l27 
In sum, there are a few potentially viable justifications for an agency's 
nonacquiescence, such as a significant agency expertise advantage over the 
federal courts, a pressing need for administrative efficiency promoted by the 
nonacquiescence, and a substantively appropriate justification. However, 
simply because there are potential theoretical justifications does not mean that 
all agency nonacquiescence is appropriate. Costs must also be considered, 
including the problems of inconsistent results, the effect on non-litigants, and 
whether problems such as agency capture are present. Thus, agency nonac-
quiescence should be evaluated in each individual situation to determine 
whether it is appropriate. One of the reasons for this careful and close eval-
uation is shown in the following section - where an analysis of the EEOC's 
nonacquiescence policy using the above framework reveals that it is funda-
mentally flawed and results in significant negative real-world consequences. 
IV. PERILOUS NONACQUIESCENCE: THE EEOC EXAMPLE 
A. The EEOC Nonacquiescence Policy 
In order to analyze the EEOC's specific nonacquiescence policy dis-
cussed here, an understanding of the EEOC's role in handling claims of dis-
crimination by federal employees is first needed. 
In Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress charged the 
EEOC with administering and enforcing federal anti-discrimination in em-
ployment statutes. 128 Enforcement powers under Title VII and other federal 
anti-discrimination statutes are vested in the EEOC, a purportedly indepen-
dent agency.129 While the EEOC tends to be primarily recognized for its role 
in overseeing the implementation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and other federal anti-discrimination statutes 130 as to employees in the private 
wart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regu-
lation, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 655, 663 (1985); Sunstein [Chevron], supra note 16, at 
2082. For a discussion of the manner in which agencies may become biased toward 
those they regulate, see Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Adminis-
trative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1669, 1713-16 (1975). 
127. Sunstein [Constitutionalism], supra note 126, at 450; see also Strauss, supra 
note 15, at 579 (noting the need to ensure control over agencies). 
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (2006). 
129.Id. While the EEOC is technically an independent agency, even independent 
agencies are subject to significant control by the Executive. See Strauss, supra note 
15, at 648-50. 
130. These laws include the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 
(2006), the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.c. § 701 (2006), and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.c. § 621-34 (2006). This Article focuses on Title VII be-
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sector, it also administers these statutes as to employees of the federal gov-
ernment. 13\ 
Originally, Title VII applied to private sector employees working for 
employers of a specific size; it did not apply to federal employees. \32 How-
ever, in 1972, Title VII was amended to include coverage of federal em-
ployees. 133 The substance of the anti-discrimination provisions is identical as 
to federal and non-federal employees; yet the procedural mechanism for han-
dling claims does differ. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 
empowered the EEOC to enforce the Act "through appropriate remedies" and 
to "issue such rules, regulations, orders and instructions as it deems necessary 
and appropriate to carry out its responsibilities .... ,,134 Under the Act, the 
heads of agencies are required to comply with the EEOC's "rules, regula-
. d d . . ,,135 tIons, or ers, an InstructIons. 
The EEOC's regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act establish de-
tailed procedures for handling discrimination complaints by federal em-
ployees. 136 There is a complex administrative process for handling the em-
ployee's complaint, which requires the employing federal agency to investi-
gate. The employee is then offered the option of an administrative hearing 
conducted by an EEOC administrative judge. 137 The employing agency may 
adopt the decision of the administrative judge or issue its own.138 If it does 
not adopt the administrative judge's decision, it must also appeal the decision 
to the EEOC. 139 Appeals are decided by the EEOC's Office of Federal Oper-
cause the majority of complaints arise out of that statute; however, the principles 
articulated herein are applicable to most of these other sources of protection, as there 
is little substantive difference in the role of the EEOC in interpreting and administer-
ing those laws. However, there is authority for the proposition that the EEOC does 
have a greater role, and is entitled to more deference, with regard to the ADA than 
with other anti-discrimination laws. See Theodore W. Wem, Judicial Deference to 
EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights Act, the ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a 
Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. LJ. 1533, 1534 (1999) (discussing the different 
grants of authority to the EEOC). 
13l. 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-16 (2006). 
132. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). 
133. See Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, § 11, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (2006). 
Other changes were also made at this time, including increasing the EEOC's en-
forcement powers by allowing it to bring suit in federal court on behalf of employees. 
See id. § 3. 
134. Jd. § 1l. 
135. Id. 
136. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.101-.707 (2008). 
137. This "administrative judge" is not an administrative law judge but merely a 
lawyer employed by the EEOC. In my own experience, I have encountered EEOC 
administrative judges who were hired without having ever been counsel on a case, 
having been hired either directly from a clerkship or from law school. 
138.29 C.F.R. § 1614.11O(a)(2008). 
139. Jd. §§ 1614.101-.707. 
2009] THE HUNDRED-YEARS WAR 975 
ations (OFO).140 The Office of Federal Operations reviews an agency's final 
decision de novo, while an administrative judge's factual findings are re-
viewed based on substantial evidence. 141 The final OFO decision is mandato-
ry and binding on the agency;142 the agency cannot appeal the final OFO de-
.. 143 
ClSlon. 
While the agency is bound by the final OFO decision, employees are 
not. Employees may bring claims in the federal district courts if aggrieved by 
the final decision on their complaint or if sufficient time has passed and no 
fmal decision has been issued. l44 These cases may be presented as a claim 
for enforcement of the final decision or for the case to be tried de novo. 145 
In these federal employee cases, the EEOC has implemented a policy of 
nonacquiescence. Specifically, the EEOC has stated that, in deciding federal 
sector cases, the EEOC's policy and precedent controls over federal court 
precedent, except Supreme Court decisions. The EEOC's policy is most 
clearly articulated in its Administrative Judges' Handbook ("Handbook"). 
There, the EEOC instructs its Administrative Judges that they 
must follow [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission policy 
and precedent in adjudicating their cases. When there is a conflict 
between the Commission's position and that ofthe Circuit Court in 
the jurisdiction where the Administrative Judge sits, an 
Administrative Judge must follow Commission policy but may 
acknowledge that the Circuit Court has reached a different 
conclusion. 146 
In addition, OFO has asserted that the EEOC's nonacquiescence policy 
applies at the administrative appellate level. In Montemorra v. Snow,147 OFO 
140. ld. § 1614.404(a). 
14l. ld. § 1614.405. 
142.1d. § 1614.502. 
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (2008); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407; Laber v. Harvey, 
438 F.3d 404, 416 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that the agency has no right to seek judicial 
review of OFO decisions). There is a process in place for requesting reconsideration 
ofOFO's initial decision. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405 (2008). 
144. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-16(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407. 
145. Initially, it was unclear whether the federal courts would review the adminis-
trative procedure findings or would hear the case de novo. Compare Abrams v. John-
son, 534 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1976) (entitled to de novo trial), with Haire v. Calloway, 
526 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1975) (not entitled to de novo trial). In Chandler v. Roude-
bush, 425 U.S. 840,844-46 (1976), the Supreme Court resolved the conflict by hold-
ing that federal employees were entitled to a de novo trial in the federal courts. See 
29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g) (2008). 
146. EEOC HANDBOOK, supra note 13. 
147. Montemorra v. Snow, E.E.O.C. Doc. No. 01A41536, 2005 WL 1936122, at 
*3 n.4 (Aug. 2, 2005). 
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noted, "We remind the agency that the Commission finds circuit court deci-
sions as merely persuasive and non-binding.,,148 Despite the statement of the 
policy in the Handbook and in Montemorra, the EEOC provides no rationale 
for its nonacquiescence policy. 149 And, while the language used in Monte-
morra suggests that OFO might use federal court of appeals decisions in ad-
judicating appeals, this does not appear to be the case. For example, in Mon-
temorra, instead of discussing or citing to federal courts of appeals decisions 
interpreting Title VII, OFO cited to a treatise. ISO Similarly, in addressing the 
standard to be applied in determining whether an allegation of harassment 
states a claim under Title Vll, OFO's seminal case on the topic discussed 
Supreme Court cases on the issue and then discussed OFO decisions; no low-
er federal court decisions were mentioned. lSI 
B. The Framework Applied to the EEOC's Policy 
1. The EEOC's Interpretations of Title VII Are Not Entitled to 
Chevron Deference 
As noted above, the preliminary inquiry in exammmg an agency's 
nonacquiescence is whether the agency's interpretation of federal law is 
entitled to Chevron deference. In the EEOC's situation, the EEOC is 
asserting its entitlement to not acquiesce in any of its interpretations of the 
federal anti-discrimination statutes; thus, the preliminary inquiry is whether 
the EEOC is generally entitled to Chevron deference when it issues 
interpretations ofthe federal anti-discrimination statutes. 
Under the relevant standards of agency deference, even the EEOC's in-
terpretations of Title Vll created using formal procedures are entitled to, at 
most, Skidmore deference, not Chevron deference. This is due to the lack of 
congressional authorization for the EEOC to engage in substantive rulemak-
148.ld. 
149. The EEOC also failed to provide me with any documents explaining its non-
acquiescence policy when I requested any documents (pursuant to the Freedom of 
Information Act) explaining or providing a rationale for its policy. 
150. Montemorra, 2005 WL 1936122, at *3 (citing Ernest C. Hadley, A GUIDE TO 
FEDERAL SECTOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LAW AND PRACTICE (2004)). In the same 
case, deciding a different legal question as to when retaliation may be inferred, OFO 
relied on its own precedent rather than any federal court decisions. ld. The Commis-
sion framed its reliance on its own precedent as follows: "[o]ur case law holds that 
this nexus may be shown by evidence that the adverse treatment followed by the pro-
tected activity within such a period of time and in such a manner that a reprisal mo-
tive is inferred." ld. (citations omitted). 
151. See Cobb v. Rubin, EEOC Doc. No. 05970077, 1997 WL 123295, at *7 -* 11 
(Mar. 13, 1997). 
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ing. 152 No Supreme Court decision has ever granted Chevron deference to an 
EEOC pronouncement on the substance of Title VIL I53 Instead, the Supreme 
Court has independently examined issues on which the EEOC has opined and 
reached its own conclusions without relying upon the EEOC's position.1 54 
The Court has indicated that the reason for this lack of deference is that Con-
gress did not "give[] rule making authority to interpret the substantive provi-
sions of Title Vll,,,155 which would entitle the EEOC's interpretations to Che-
vron deference. 156 
152. While the EEOC does not enjoy the authority to create rules substantively 
interpreting Title VII with the force of law, see, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 
499 U.S. 244 (1991), under the ADEA and ADA, Congress did grant the EEOC some 
such authority. See 29 U.S.c. § 628 (2006) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2006) 
(ADA). However, the scope of this authority is uncertain, being at least somewhat 
limited. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (concluding that 
disparate impact claim is available under ADEA without relying upon EEOC interpre-
tation of ADEA); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999) (EEOC 
not granted rulemaking authority as to definition of "disability" under the ADA). But 
see Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination 
Policy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutory interpretation, 1995 
UTAH L. REv. 51 (1995) (arguing that the EEOC was granted rulemaking authority as 
to Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA). 
153. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Early on in its review of 
EEOC regulations, the Supreme Court did grant deference to the EEOC's position, 
but this approach ceased decades ago. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
424, 433-34 (1971) ("The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, having en-
forcement responsibility, has issued guidelines interpreting s 703(h) to permit only the 
use of job-related tests. The administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing 
agency is entitled to great deference. . .. Since the Act and its legislative history 
support the Commission's construction, this affords good reason to treat the guide-
lines as expressing the will of Congress.") (citations omitted), with Arabian Am. Oil 
Co., 499 U.S. at 257-58 (noting that, at most, the EEOC's interpretation that Title VII 
applies to U.S. citizens abroad is entitled to Skidmore deference), and Smith, 544 U.S. 
at 239 (independently determining whether a disparate impact claim is available under 
the ADEA and only noting the EEOC's position without analyzing it or relying upon 
it). 
154. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543-44 (1971) (discuss-
ing what constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification without reference to EEOC 
interpretation); Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 257-58 (noting but not relying upon 
EEOC interpretation as to extraterritorial application of Title VII); Smith, 544 U.S. at 
239 (independently determining whether a disparate impact claim is available under 
the ADEA and only noting the EEOC's position without analyzing it or relying upon 
it). 
155. Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106, 122 (2002) (O'Connor, 1., 
concurring in judgment) (citing Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 257); Gen. Elec. 
Co., 429 U.S. at 141. 
156. Edelman, 535 U.S. at 114 (O'Connor, 1., concurring in judgment) (citations 
omitted). The Court has given Chevron deference to the EEOC's procedural regula-
tions under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. See Fed. Express Corp. v. 
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The Supreme Court has shown even less deference to the EEOC when 
analyzing interpretations of Title VII where the EEOC spoke in its adjudica-
tive capacity rather than in the context of interpretations contained in inter-
pretive guidances or similar documents. 157 In the adjudicative context, it 
appears that deference is simply not relevant when evaluating the EEOC's 
adjudicative decisions interpreting Title VII. For example, in West v. Gibson 
the Court addressed the issue of whether the EEOC was entitled to order fed-
eral agencies to pay compensatory damages to aggrieved employees under 
Title VIl. 158 The issue arose out of a federal employee's sex discrimination 
claim that had proceeded through the administrative process within the De-
partment of Veterans Affairs. 159 The Department found against the em-
ployee, who appealed to OFO. 16o The Office of Federal Operations reversed 
the Department's decision. 161 
When the Department failed to take action as directed by the EEOC, the 
employee filed suit in federal district court seeking enforcement of the EEOC 
decision.162 In that action, the employee sought compensatory damages, 
which had not been sought in the administrative process. 163 At that time, 
OFO had articulated a rule in cases it decided on appeal that it had the author-
ity to order agencies to pay compensatory damages. 164 The Seventh Circuit, 
in addressing the compensatory damages issue, first determined the appropri-
ate degree of deference to the EEOC's position, determining that some defe-
rence was owed. 165 
However, on appeal, the Supreme Court analyzed the federal statute at 
issue without addressing deference to the EEOC and ultimately concluded 
that the EEOC was entitled to award compensatory damages. 166 Despite find-
ing in favor of the EEOC's position, at no point in its opinion, or in the dis-
Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147 (2008). One might argue that the EEOC's nonacquies-
cence policy is procedural in nature rather than substantive, as it governs the adminis-
trative handling of discrimination claims. However, an agency cannot be entitled to 
obtain substantive rulemaking powers it was not granted by using a procedural device 
such as a nonacquiescence policy. 
157. See, e.g., West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212 (1999) (focusing on statutory con-
struction of Title VII rather than discussing the EEOC's decision in the context of a 
deferral analysis). 
158. !d. at214. 





164.Id. (citing Jackson v. Runyon, EEOC Doc. No. 01923399, 1993 WL 
1509968, at *2 (Nov. 12, 1992». 
165. Gibson v. Brown, 137 F.3d 992, 995-96 (7th Cir. 1998), vacated by West, 
527 U.S. 212. 
166. West, 527 U.S. at 217-22. 
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sent to the opinion, did any Justice even mention deference to the EEOC's 
position as articulated in the OFO decisions. 167 The lack of discussion is 
made even more surprising by the fact that, leading up to this decision, both 
the Seventh and Fifth Circuits had explicitly discussed how much deference 
to give to the EEOC's adjudicative interpretation of Title VIL I68 Both courts 
appeared to assume that some level of deference to the EEOC's interpretation 
. 169 
was appropnate. 
Against this backdrop, the lack of reference to deference in the Supreme 
Court's decision might appear to be unusual. But, given the Supreme Court's 
statements and decisions in other cases indicating that the EEOC's substan-
tive interpretations of Title VII are not entitled to Chevron deference, the lack 
of discussion on deference makes some sense. OFO decisions in federal sec-
tor cases are made with less deliberation and less formally than manuals or 
interpretive guidance statements. 170 Manuals and interpretive guidance 
statements are less likely to be given deference under Chevron than are regu-
lations produced via formal rulemaking. Thus, OFO decisions are fairly far 
removed from the core types of agency decisions that are entitled to Chevron 
deference by the federal courtS.17I Since no Chevron deference is due, the 
inquiry becomes whether the EEOC's nonacquiescence policy is justified 
according to the considerations established above in Section 1l1.B. 
2. The Benefits of the EEOC's Nonacquiescence Policy 
a. Special Expertise - Generally 
One of the presumed benefits of a nonacquiescence decision is that a su-
perior interpretation of the law is reached by the agency due to the agency's 
167. See generally id. 
168. See Gibson, 137 F.3d at 995-96; Fitzgerald v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 
121 F.3d 203, 207-08 (5th CiT. 1997). 
169. Gibson, 137 F.3d at 995-96; Fitzgerald, 121 F.3d at 207-08. 
170. See supra Part IlI.B (noting the high volume of claims handled by OFO and 
the lack of support and legal analysis contained in the opinions issued by OFO); see 
also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001) (discussing high volume 
of decisions issued and lack of sufficiently senior official input as facts suggesting 
Chevron deference is inappropriate). 
171. The EEOC's assertions in the Handbook and Montemorra are particularly 
disturbing when viewed in light of the numerous Supreme Court cases stating that the 
EEOC is not entitled to Chevron deference when engaging in substantive interpreta-
tions of Title VII. However, it is possible that the EEOC views its interpretations of 
law in the federal sector cases as somehow entitled to more deference than in the 
private sector due to its authority to issue orders binding other federal agencies. 
While Congress did grant the EEOC such authority, it was not accompanied by a 
grant of authority to issue interpretations on the substantive meaning of Title VII in 
federal sector cases. 
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special expertise. However, in the case of the EEOC, this is not a particularly 
compelling rationale. There are four aspects to this point. First, federal 
courts have significant experience with employment discrimination claims 
under Title VII. 172 Employment discrimination cases make up nearly ten 
percent of the federal district courts' dockets. 173 This particular issue is not 
one that federal courts rarely handle. Second, Title VII is not an area where 
the agency has such significant scientific or technical expertise that the feder-
al courts are unable to adjudicate claims properly.174 Unlike agencies such as 
the Environmental Protection Agency,175 or even the FDA,176 the EEOC 
oversees a subject matter that is not generally scientific or technical in na-
ture. l77 
Third, the EEOC's record at the Supreme Court suggests that the Court 
is unlikely to agree with its interpretations of Title VII. Even when the 
EEOC creates interpretive guidelines and allows for notice and comment on 
them, the Supreme Court has rarely agreed with the EEOC's interpretation. 178 
The Supreme Court's comments on the EEOC's interpretations of the law 
have included statements that "the Commission is clearly wrong,,179 and that 
its interpretation is "impermissible.,,180 Some scholars have found this lack of 
respect for the EEOC improper and frustrating, especially when Congress 
legislatively overrules the Supreme Court and adopts the EEOC's position, 181 
172. See Kevin M. Clennont, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, How 
Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL'y J. 547, 548 (2003). 
173.Id. 
174. See Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the 
EEOC, 74 FORD. L. REV. 1937, 1937 (2006) (opining that the Supreme Court may not 
believe that anti-discrimination law interpretation requires significant expertise suffi-
cient to defer to the EEOC's interpretations of law); Wem, supra note 130, at 1579 
(noting the "non technical nature" of anti-discrimination laws as a possible reason for 
lack of deference to the EEOC). 
175. See Jason J. Czamezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisiontnak-
ing, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. 
COLO. L. REv. 767, 771 (2008) (discussing scientific expertise as a basis for deferring 
to EPA decision-making). 
176. See James O'Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA's Second Century: Judi-
cial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 
939,940 (2008) (noting the longstanding deference given to the FDA due to the per-
ception of the scientific nature of its work). 
177. The exception to this may be with disparate impact cases where a statistical 
analysis of personnel data is required. 
178. See Hart, supra note 174, at 1937 (noting that the Supreme Court gives "re-
markably little respect" to the EEOC). 
179. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581,600 (2004). 
180. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,472 (1999). 
181. See Hart, supra note 174, at 1950-51 (arguing that, regardless of the standard 
the Supreme Court uses to evaluate the EEOC's regulations and interpretations of 
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but the reality remains the same: the Supreme Court tends to disagree with 
the EEOC's interpretations of Title VII. 182 
The problem of EEOC incorrectness (as perceived by the Supreme 
Court) is even potentially worse in its adjudication of federal employee 
claims than when it promulgates regulations and interpretative guidance. In 
the latter situation, the EEOC has the benefit of time to create its regulation or 
interpretation, take comments, and reconsider its position in light of input 
from stakeholders. However, in the adjudicative process with federal em-
ployees, the EEOC is under significant time pressure, making analysis fraught 
with potential for error. In FY 2005, the EEOC decided 7,415 appeals. 183 
Yet the EEOC's budget for FY 2006 indicates only twenty-two full-time 
equivalent positions allotted to OFO. 184 Even if all these persons were deci-
sion-makers, which is not likely since only one department within OFO 
processes the appeals,185 it amounts to a staggering 337 appeals per person 
per year - or approximately 1.5 appeals per day. 186 
b. Special Expertise - Empirical Data 
Finally, an empirical review of the decisions issued by OFO also under-
cuts the argument that the EEOC's special expertise should be sufficientjusti-
federal anti-discrimination law, the Supreme Court rarely agrees with the EEOC's 
regulations and interpretations); see also The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.c. § 
2000e-2 (2006) (legislatively overruling the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
after-acquired evidence doctrine). 
182. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (holding that 
EEOC's interpretation of Title VII as applying to American citizens working abroad 
is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute). The EEOC's interpretations of 
the procedural aspects of the federal anti-discrimination laws may receive more re-
spect from the Court. See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S.Ct. 1147, 
1154 (2008) (noting that the EEOC's interpretation of the term "charge" is reasona-
ble). 
183. EEOC ANNUAL REpORT ON THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE FY 2005, available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/federallfsp2005/index.html. 
184. EEOC 2006 FAIR ACT INVENTORY, II. 52-56, available at http://www.eeoc. 
gov /abouteeoc/p Ian! commercial_ 2006.html. 
185. This department is the Appellate Review Program. See http://www.eeoc. 
gov/federal/fsp. 
186. This assumes a total number of working days of 225 per year. This number 
is based on a non-leap year with 365 days, of which 10 are federal holidays and 104 
are weekend days. It also assumes that an employee uses half of all sick days (6.5) 
and all annual leave days per year and that the employee has 19.5 days of annual 
leave per year (the average between the most days, 26, and least days, 13, an em-
ployee can accrue). See http://www.opm.gov/lnsure/heaithlenrollmentinew_ 
employees.asp#leave (last visited Jul. 2, 2008) (indicating accrual rates for sick and 
annual leave); http://www.opm.gov/oca/workschlHTMUHOLlDAY.asp# 
HolidaysforFederalEmployees (last visited Jul. 2, 2008) (listing federal holidays). 
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fication for its nonacquiescence policy. If the decisions rendered by OFO 
indicated a better, more nuanced, or more in-depth analysis of Title VII cases 
than those of the federal courts, this would support the nonacquiescence poli-
cy and suggest that OFO's decisions should be entitled to equal or greater 
value than those of the federal courtS. 187 However, the substance of OFO's 
decisions does not indicate that the EEOC's special expertise provides any 
benefit. Indeed, the substance of OFO's decisions suggests that OFO should 
be relying on federal court cases rather than generating its own body of law. 
Perhaps due to the incredible volume of cases OFO handles and the relatively 
small number of OFO attorneys working on these cases, the substance of the 
decisions is frequently unimpressive and is not better than, and in some re-
spects even compares poorly with, the work product of the federal courts of 
appeals. 
i. Methodology 
I reviewed one month of decisions from OFO l88 and categorized the 
opinions based on the substance of the legal analysis in the decision. An ini-
tial review of these opinions revealed a startling number of cases where OFO 
did not even cite to legal authority for its decision. Upon further review, 1 
was able to develop three basic categories of decisions to suit the different 
levels of legal analysis in the opinions. While not a perfect fit in all in-
stances, the cases can generally be classified as follows. The first category of 
cases involves opinions that contain some statement of legal standards regard-
ing Title VB with citation to authority, as well as some discussion of the facts 
of the case (Category 1). These opinions contained the most in-depth legal 
I . f h hr f" 189 ana YSIS 0 t e t ee types 0 oplDlons. 
The second category of cases involves opinions containing no statement 
of legal standard or citation regarding Title VB but some explanation of the 
legal standard and citation regarding the procedural context of the case (such 
as a grant of summary judgment or motion to dismiss) (Category II). A typi-
187. See Pierce, supra note 100, at 2240-41 (noting the reputational value of well-
reasoned decisions). This would suggest that perhaps the area of law is so complex or 
complicated that courts should defer to the EEOC's special expertise. However, there 
appears to be a perception that employment discrimination law is simply not an area 
of law where the courts feel the need to defer based on agency expertise. See Wern, 
supra note 130, at 1579 (noting that the non-technical nature of the EEOC's subject 
matter may lead to a lack of deference by judges). 
188. To obtain these cases, I used the Westlaw database FLB-EEOC and searched 
by date for all cases decided in January 2006. This resulted in 361 opinions by OFO. 
189. Initially, research assistants reviewed the decisions, but I subsequently read 
all the cases and reviewed the categorizations myself. Nearly all opinions begin with 
a reference to the underlying statute, regulations, or both governing the procedural 
process; those preliminary references were not counted for purposes of these catego-
ries. 
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cal Category II case contains a few paragraphs of facts, followed by a para-
graph or two establishing the standard used in the specific procedural posture 
of the case, then a bare legal conclusion. 190 
Third, some opinions contain no citation and no statement of legal stan-
dard at all (Category III). These opinions begin with a one-paragraph recita-
tion of the most basic facts of the case, followed by a one or two-sentence 
legal conclusion such as the following: 
After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration 
of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission to afftrm the agency's final 
order, because the Administrative Judge's issuance of a decision 
without a hearing was appropriate and a preponderance of the 
record evidence does not establish that discrimination occurred. 191 
After my review of the OFO decisions, I then reviewed the decisions of 
one federal court of appeals, the Fourth Circuit, made in the same time pe-
riod, January 2006, to compare them to OFO decisions. I selected the Fourth 
190. For example, in Sadzinski v. Potter, EEOC Doc. No. 01A53863, 2006 WL 
398328 (Jan. 31, 2006), the language used was as follows: 
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without 
a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact. 29 C.F.R. § l614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the 
summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judg-
ment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive 
legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no ge-
nuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's 
function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there 
are genuine issues for trial: Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving 
party must be believed at the summary judgment stage, and all justifiable 
inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An 
issue of fact is 'genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact 
finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corporation, 
846 F.2d 103,105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is 'material' ifit has the poten-
tial to affect the outcome of a case. If a case can only be resolved by 
weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate. In 
the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider 
summary judgment only upon a determination that the record has been 
adequately developed for summary disposition. After a careful review of 
the record, the Commission finds that the grant of summary judgment was 
appropriate, as no genuine dispute of material fact exists. 
ld. at * 1-*2. 
191. Garcia v. Potter, EEOC Doc. No. 01A50363, 2006 WL 266478 (Jan. 26, 
2006). 
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Circuit as the comparator because it is physically the closest circuit to the 
location where OFO is located (D.C.), other than the D.C. Circuit. I elected 
not to use the D.C. Circuit because it is unlike the numerical federal circuits 
in terms of jurisdiction. I categorized the Fourth Circuit opinions using the 
same criteria. 
ii. Results 
The results of this review are set forth in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
Overview of Research Results 
Category I Category II Category III 
(SOME (SOME (NO 
ANALYSIS CITATION BUT CITATION 
AND NO ANALYSIS) OR 
CITATION) ANALYSIS) 
OFO 240 (66%) 17 (5%) 104 (29%) 
FOURTH 214 (86%) 0(0%) 36 (14%) CIRCUIT 
The results are disturbing for several reasons. First, a surprisingly large 
percentage of the OFO opinions are classified in Category III. Specifically, 
29% contained no citation to or discussion of legal authority. Taking Catego-
ry II and III together, 121 out of 361 cases (34%) lack citation to or discus-
sion of federal anti-discrimination laws. 
The remaining cases, Category I cases, do at least cite to some authority 
for their decisions. However, as indicated in Table 2, a close look at these 
opinions reveals that some decisions lack actual legal analysis. Instead of 
substantive legal analysis, the opinions tend to recite well-established legal 
standards, cite to authority, and then proceed to discuss the factual merits of 
the appeal without referencing legal authority again. For example, 9% of 
Category I cases involve the alleged breach of a settlement agreement and 
contain identical or substantially similar sentences articulating how the EEOC 
judges determine whether a settlement agreement has been breached. Then, 
the opinions go on to determine whether there is a breach, without referenc-
ing the citations or authority again and without engaging in any comparison 
between the current case and cited authority. 192 Similarly, 12% of Category I 
192. The following is an example ofthe language used: 
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement 
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at 
2009] THE HUNDRED-YEARS WAR 985 
opinions contain nearly identical paragraphs describing the applicable legal 
standards for establishing a Title VII claim of disparate treatment. 193 The 
any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties. The 
Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a contract 
between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules of contract 
construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense, EEOC Re-
quest No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further 
held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, not 
some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction. Eg-
gleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795 
(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard to 
the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied 
on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon 0 v. United States Postal Service, 
EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states that if 
the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning 
must be determined from the four comers of the instrument without resort 
to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. 
Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984). 
Sheppard v. Norton, EEOC Doc. No. 01A46193, 2006 WL 266290, *2-*3 (Jan. 27, 
2006). 
193. The following is an example of the language used: 
A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analy-
sis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792 (1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima fa-
cie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reason-
ably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited con-
sideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell 
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 
567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Department of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the 
agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsi-
bility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Hon-
or Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the 
first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie 
case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated 
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, 
the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions were motivated 
by discrimination. See U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 
460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department of Transporta-
tion, EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 
8, 1990); Washington v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 
03900056 (May 31, 1990). 
Abron v. Potter, EEOC Doc. No. 01A55425, 2006 WL 266271 (Jan. 24, 2006). 
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paragraphs following these legal standards purport to apply the law articu-
lated but fail to cite to it and fail to compare the current case to past 
precedent. A third common type of Category I case is one that deals with 
requests for reconsideration. In these cases, the opinions cite to the applica-
ble EEOC regulations then go on to state in a conclusory manner that the 
standard is not met in the current case. 194 
TABLE 2 
Common Types of Category I OFO Decisions that Lack Substantive Analysis 
Breach of Settlement Disparate Treatment Requests 
Agreement Claims for Reconsideration 
22 (9%) 28 (12%) 33 (14%) 
In sum, OFO opinions lack sufficient in-depth analysis to justify ignor-
ing federal court of appeals decisions. Indeed, a brief comparison to Fourth 
Circuit opinions reveals that the OFO opinions reflect a more shallow analy-
sis. The most striking difference between the Fourth Circuit and OFO deci-
sions is that there were only thirty-six Fourth Circuit decisions (or 14%) that 
could be classified in Category 1l1.195 The remainder of the decisions were 
Category I decisions. This indicates that the federal courts, or at least the 
Fourth Circuit, tend to provide legal support for more decisions than OFO 
does. Using this metric, it appears that the Fourth Circuit is disposing of 
cases using more substantive legal analysis than OFO. 
In all fairness, however, there are some indications that the depth of 
analysis shown by OFO and the Fourth Circuit are fairly similar. Within the 
Category I cases, the Fourth Circuit, like OFO, demonstrated a tendency to 
194. The specific language used is typically as follows: 
EEOC Regulations provide that the Commission may, in its discretion, 
grant a request to reconsider any previous Commission decision where the 
requesting party demonstrates that: (I) the appellate decision involved a 
clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or (2) the appellate 
decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or opera-
tions of the agency. See 29 C.F.R. §1614.405(b). 
After reconsidering the previous decision and the entire record, the 
Commission finds that the request fails to meet the criteria of 29 C.F.R. § 
1614.405(b), and it is the decision of the Commission to deny the request. 
The decision in EEOC Appeal No. 0lA54702 remains the Commission's 
final decision. There is no further right of administrative appeal on the 
decision of the Commission on this request. 
Turner v. Potter, EEOC Doc. No. 05A60326, 2006 WL 266279 (Jan. 27, 2006). 
195. For purposes of this review, I considered both published and nonprecedential 
decisions. 
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use identical language and citation, with no or nearly no substantive analysis, 
to dispose of numerous cases. Specifically, in 56 out of the 214 Category I 
cases (26%), the court used identical languagel96 to address cases where a 
prisoner collaterally attacked the sentence imposed by the court. 197 There 
were also numerous cases where the court provided a citation for its decision 
but followed that citation with no substantive analysis. Instead, it merely 
provided a few sentences articulating its conclusions. 198 On the other hand, 
there were a few Fourth Circuit cases where the court conducted significant, 
in-depth legal analysis far beyond that of any of the OFO cases. 199 
196. In a few cases, the court added an additional sentence or two to its opinion, 
but the citations remained the same. 
197. The following is an example ofthe language used: 
The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certif-
icate of appealability. 28 U.S.c. § 2253(c)(I) (2000). A certificate ofap-
pealability will not issue absent "a substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies 
this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 
district court's assessment of his constitutional claims is debatable and 
that any dispositive procedural rulings of the district court are also debat-
able or wrong. See Miller-EI v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 
1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 
120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676,683-
84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and con-
clude that Harris has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 
deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense 
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 
decisional process. 
United States v. Harris, 164 F. App'x. 406, 406-07 (4th Cir. 2006). 
198. The most common situation where the court took this approach was in cases 
involving immigration appeals such as requests for asylum. See, e.g., lrwina v. Gon-
zales, 161 F. App'x 302, 302 (4th Cir. 2006) (In an immigration case, after citations, 
the court stated only the following: "Having conducted our review, we conclude that 
substantial evidence supports the finding that Irwina failed to meet these standards. 
We accordingly deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument be-
cause the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process."). Another situation 
using this type of cursory approach involved claims of improper sentencing. See, e.g., 
Boone v. Hickey, 161 F. App'x 279-80 (4th Cir. 2006) (In review of sentencing con-
ducted under Booker, after citations, the court stated only the following: "Because 
Boone does not meet the standard set forth in In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th 
Cir. 2000), we affirm the denial of relief. We dispense with oral argument because 
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 
court and argument would not aid the decisional process."). 
199. Compare R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 435 F.3d 
521 (4th Cir. 2006); Warch v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 510 (4th Cir. 2006); Jean 
v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 475 (4th Cir. 2006), with Dalesandro v. Potter, EEOC Doc. No. 
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One could posit very different conclusions from this information. For 
example, on its face, it suggests that the Fourth Circuit does conduct more 
significant, in-depth legal analysis than OFO does on a regular basis. Alter-
natively, it is possible that the Fourth Circuit had more substantive or com-
plex cases during January 2006 and OFO's docket that month had nothing 
requiring such detailed analysis. It is also possible that OFO has already ad-
dressed with substantive legal analysis nearly every possible significant legal 
issue posed under federal anti-discrimination laws, and thus it is not regularly 
presented with new opportunities to conduct significant analysis. Assessing 
these (and other) possibilities is unfortunately beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle.z°o Regardless of whether it establishes that the Fourth Circuit always or 
regularly conducts more substantive legal analysis than OFO, at a minimum, 
it fails to support any contention that OFO's analysis is more in depth or 
substantive than that of the federal courts - rebutting one rationale for OFO's 
nonacquiescence policy. 
c. Administrative Efficiency 
The EEOC has not provided a justification for its nonacquiescence poli-
cy.201 However, because the EEOC handles cases from across the United 
States, it is likely that the EEOC would assert a practical need to have a single 
approach to interpretations of the law at the agency.z°2 
While it seems easier and simpler for OFO to have one body of law to 
reference in deciding its cases, by virtue of the policy, OFO is taking on the 
task of developing and interpreting the law, which would not be required to 
01A50250, 2006 WL 266497 (Jan. 30, 2006); Lewis v. Potter, EEOC Doc. No. 
01A52754, 2006 WL 266262 (Jan. 27, 2006). 
200. Ascertaining the veracity of the first possibility would require a significant 
review over a more extended period of time than one month. As for the second possi-
bility, it is nearly impossible to prove or disprove, as it would require access to all the 
underlying information in the cases presented to both the Fourth Circuit and OFO, 
and much of this information is not publicly available. Particularly as to the federal 
employee claims at OFO, the claimants' privacy rights prevent access to the docu-
ments and information available to OFO at the time it reaches it decisions. 
201. In order to ascertain whether the EEOC had at some point provided ajustifi-
cation, I conducted research in the Federal Register and located nothing. I subse-
quently searched the EEOC's website and located the Handbook. I then submitted a 
Freedom of Information Act request seeking any documents discussing or mentioning 
the policy. The only document submitted in response to the request was the Hand-
book. If the EEOC did ever publish a document justifying its policy, it is one that is 
extraordinarily difficult to find. 
202. This is one of the commonly asserted rationales for engaging in nonacquies-
cence. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 14, at 743-44; Coenen, supra note 61, at 
1414; Diller & Morawetz, supra note 59, at 813-14. 
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the same extent as if it were to follow federal court precedent.203 There is, 
then, some cost imposed on OFO by its policy that should be weighed against 
the potential benefits of the policy. In addition, it is unclear to what extent 
OFO is even using its own law as the basis for its decisions, as many OFO 
decisions lack any indication of the legal authority for the outcome. This 
suggests that following federal court precedent might improve the quality of 
the decisions, as OFO might be forced to explain its decision under the appli-
cable federal precedent. 
Another flaw in the argument that the EEOC requires uniformity is that 
uniformity at the administrative level has to be balanced against the cost of a 
lack of uniformity within any given case. The use of one approach at the 
agency may provide efficiency benefits at OFO, but it is at the potential ex-
pense of uniformity of result for anyone individual's claim. For example, a 
litigant may fmd one result at OFO and a different result in federal court. 
Even if the result at OFO and in federal court would be the same the majority 
of the time, the official policy of disregarding federal court cases suggests to 
the litigants that the result may well be different; otherwise, why not use the 
same law? In addition, because OFO's decisions only create a national stan-
dard as to federal employees, other employees are subject to the standards 
established by the federal courts in the circuit in which they work. Thus, 
when considering both public and private sector employees, OFO's approach 
undercuts the goal of national uniformity. 
d. Substantive Justification 
The fmal aspect to justifying an agency's nonacquiescence decision is a 
substantive one: the agency should be producing an interpretation of law that 
has a good prospect for surviving federal court review. However, the 
EEOC's nonacquiescence decision is a broad policy. In essence, the EEOC is 
effectively asserting that all its interpretations of Title VII would be accepted 
by federal courts reviewing the interpretations under a Skidmore standard. 
This is entirely contrary to the limited role of agency nonacquiescence in the 
absence of Chevron deference envisioned by this Article. Furthermore, it is 
nearly impossible to assess the substance of all the EEOC interpretations of 
Title VII because OFO does not identify when it is engaging in nonacquies-
cence, making it a painstaking process to discern when the OFO interpreta-
tions vary from those of the federal courts of appeals. 
203. OFO would still be required to develop and interpret the law in the absence 
of federal court precedent. 
990 MISSOURI LA W REVIEW [Vol. 74 
3. The Costs of the EEOC's Nonacquiescence Policy Are Significant 
In the case of the EEOC's nonacquiescence policy, the unique adminis-
trative and court procedures for handling federal sector cases impose signifi-
cant costs that outweigh any benefits of the policy. 
a. Costs of Dual Bodies of Law Interpreting Title VII 
The costs resulting from the procedural system established by the EEOC 
for handling federal employee complaints of discrimination make OFO's 
nonacquiescence policy untenable. The procedural system precludes a dia-
logue between the federal courts and OFO regarding different interpretations 
of Title VII. As a result, two separate bodies of law interpreting Title VII 
have arisen. This situation differs from those in other administrative law 
contexts, where courts explicitly review agency decisions and, in that context, 
have been able to speak to both the proper relationship between the agency 
and the courts and the substantive legal interpretations by the agency?04 The 
federal courts are never required to address OFO's interpretations of law and 
are rarely presented with the opportunity to do so. Indeed, it is unclear 
whether most federal courts are even aware of the body of law developed by 
OFO that governs federal employees' claims in the administrative process. 
The reason for the lack of dialogue between federal courts and the agen-
cy is the administrative process through which complaints of discrimination 
are handled. As discussed in Part II, Congress delegated to the EEOC the 
authority to create the administrative process for handling federal employee 
claims under Title VII. The EEOC's resulting regulations and the Supreme 
Court's decision in Chandler v. Roudebush205 create a system in which 
OFO's decisions are insulated from any direct review by the courts. 
Under these regulations, a federal employee's claim can present itself in 
federal court in three different procedural postures. First, the employee can 
opt out of the administrative process if it takes more than 180 days and may 
then bring suit directly in federal court?06 In this instance, the employee's 
claim is brought in federal district court and is tried de novo.207 The second 
204. See, e.g., Peters v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 302, 306 n.2 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting 
that the Board of Immigration Appeals is bound by Fifth Circuit decisions); Ladha v. 
l.N.S., 215 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2000) (same), overruled on other grounds by Ab-
ebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009); Swentek v. OPM, 76 M.S.P.R. 605, 
615 (Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. 1997) (citations omitted) (noting that the Merit Systems 
Protection Board is bound by Federal Circuit precedent). 
205.425 U.S. 840 (1976). 
206.29 C.F.R. § 1614.407(b) (2008). The employee may also opt out at the ad-
ministrative appeal stage, within 180 days of filing the appeal, if no final decision has 
been issued. ld. § 1614.407(d). 
207. See Chandler, 425 U.S. at 844, 864 (discussing procedural mechanisms for 
employees to bring suit in federal court and concluding that employees are entitled to 
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and third situations arise when the employee's claim has been fully decided in 
the administrative process. In the second option, the employee can bring suit 
in federal court if the employee is unsatisfied with the EEOC's ultimate deci-
sion on the claim.208 This allows the employee to have the federal district 
court hear his or her claim de novo.209 Third, if the EEOC decides in favor of 
the employee, the employee can seek to enforce the EEOC decision in the 
federal district COurtS.2IO In this situation, the EEOC's detennination that the 
agency discriminated against the employee is binding on the federal court, 
and the EEOC's decision cannot be reviewed by the court.211 
In the first and second options, the federal court entirely disregards the 
administrative process.212 Thus, the court will not review any interpretation 
by the EEOC of Title VII.213 In the third situation, the court does take notice 
of the administrative process. Specifically, the court accepts the EEOC's 
decision and does not review its merits.214 Thus, no matter how the case is 
brought to federal court, the court will not be called upon to decide whether 
the EEOC's interpretations of law are correct. As a result, the EEOC's inter-
pretations of law made in the adjudicative process are not directly reviewable, 
and federal courts only discuss them in exceedingly rare instances.215 
a de novo trial regardless of whether the suit is brought before or after a decision has 
been reached on the claim). 
208. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1-614.407(c), 1614.503(g). 
209. ld. 
210.29 C.F.R. §1614.503(g). 
211. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404,416-17 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that em-
ployees may either bring an enforcement claim, in which case the court does not re-
view the EEOC's decision, or bring suit de novo); Scott v. Johanns, 409 F.3d 466, 
469 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that the only two options are trial de novo or complete 
enforcement of EEOC decisions and that seeking to vary the relief ordered by the 
EEOC constitutes a request for a trial de novo); Moore v. Devine, 780 F.2d 1559, 
1563 (lith Cir. 1986) (holding that a claim is not retried de novo where enforcement 
is sought, however, in limited circumstances, enforcement may not be possible). 
212. See Chandler, 425 U.S. at 843, 864 (discussing the disagreements between 
courts of appeals as to the weight to be given to the administrative decision and con-
cluding that a trial de novo is proper). 
213. See id. 
214. See Laber, 438 F.3d at 417 (noting that, where an enforcement proceeding is 
brought by an employee, the administrative decision of the EEOC is binding as to the 
agency and is not reviewed); Moore, 780 F.2d at 1563 (same). 
215. The rare instance arises where an EEOC interpretation of the law is evaluated 
by a court in a proceeding different from the one where the interpretation was made. 
For example, the EEOC determined that it was entitled to order compensatory dam-
ages in the administrative process in the context of an adjudication. Jackson v. Ru-
nyon, EEOC Doc. No. 01923399,1992 WL 1372557 (Nov. 12, 1992). The Supreme 
Court ultimately addressed this issue, but not directly; it came before the Court based 
on a question of exhaustion of remedies. See West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212 (1999). 
An employee sought compensatory damages in federal court after not requesting them 
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This situation establishes the EEOC as the sole and fmal arbiter of what 
Title Vll means as to federal employees unless the employee sues in federal 
court. The implications of this for the administrative process are troubling. If 
employees believe that the EEOC's interpretations are worse for them than 
federal court interpretations, they will either opt out of the process at the 180 
day mark, making the administrative process irrelevant, or seek a trial in fed-
eral district court - a lawsuit in which the outcome at the administrative level 
is disregarded and, once again, the administrative process is irrelevant. The 
employee, agency, and EEOC contribute significant time and money to the 
administrative process, all of which are lost. 
A second possibility is that the EEOC is interpreting law more favorably 
to employees than the federal courts are.216 This would result in a two-tiered 
system of law, with public sector employees receiving more favorable inter-
in the administrative process, and the district court was required to determine whether 
the EEOC had authority to order compensatory damages in order to determine wheth-
er the employee had exhausted his administrative procedures as to the compensatory 
damages claim. See id. at 212. 
216. One recent situation where this has occurred is with regard to the standards 
for determining whether an employee has been harassed in retaliation for engaging in 
prior equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity under Title VII. Lynch v. Ni-
cholson, E.E.O.C. Doc. No. 01A50839, 2006 WL 3983336 (Jan. 31, 2006). OFO 
articulated the test as follows: the employee must show that 
(1) [the employee] previously engaged in EEO activity; (2) [the em-
ployee] was subjected to unwelcome conduct related to her protected 
class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on prior EEO activity; 
(4) the harassment had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering 
with [the employee's] work performance and/or creating an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive work environment, and (5) there is a basis for imput-
ing liability to the agency. 
Id. at *4 (citations omitted). This formulation allowed claims to be brought where the 
actions were intended to interfere with the employee's work. There was no require-
ment that it actually interfered with the employee's work or caused any harm. By 
contrast, even the most broadly worded approach in the federal courts of appeals 
required some harm to the employee. See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 
1242-43 (9th Cir. 2000) (defining actionable retaliation as "adverse treatment that is 
based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or 
others from engaging in protected activity" (citations omitted)). This example also 
highlights a different problem with OFO, which is its lack of consistency. In this 
formulation of the rule, OFO failed to follow the EEOC's own compliance manual 
definition of actionable retaliation, which requires that there be not only improper 
motive but also a result of that behavior - that it is reasonably likely to deter em-
ployees from engaging in protected activity. See id. The more protective standard 
enunciated by OFO was not adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court when it addressed the 
scope of protections against retaliation under Title VII in Burlington Northern & 
Sante Fe Railway v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). There, the Court adopted an ap-
proach requiring that the employer conduct be "materially adverse" such that the 
employee is subject to an actual "injury or harm." ld. at 67-68. 
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pretations of employment discrimination laws than private sector employees 
- an outcome at odds with the statutory language establishing the same anti-
discrimination protections for both groups.217 Another negative repercussion 
of this situation is that agencies' relationships with the EEOC may become 
strained as the agencies perceive the EEOC to be biased against them. 
The third possibility is that there is no systemic approach by the EEOC 
to interpret the law more in favor of the employee or the agency than do the 
federal courts. In other words, the EEOC may be acting exactly as it should, 
as a neutral decision-maker. This is the best possibility for the EEOC. But, 
even if this is the case, because the employee can always start the case over in 
federal court, there is unnecessary duplication of effort - two trials occur, and 
two appeals are taken. 
In sum, all three possible EEOC approaches to interpreting the law re-
sult in some negative repercussions for the EEOC and the litigants. 
In addition to the costs imposed by the policy on the EEOC and liti-
gants, there are costs imposed on third parties. In the cases handled by the 
EEOC, the alleged discriminating official(s) are not parties. They are, how-
ever, directly impacted by the EEOC's decisions. Agencies are under pres-
sure to prevent discrimination in the workplace. This pressure intensified in 
the past few years, after Congress passed the Notification and Federal Em-
ployee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002 ("No Fear Act,,).218 
The No Fear Act requires agencies to provide annual data on discrimination 
claims filed against the agency and to pay for the costs when it is found to 
have engaged in discrimination?19 One of the purposes of the No Fear Act 
was to pressure agencies into taking effective action to prevent discrimina-
tion.220 One ofthe obvious ways of preventing discrimination is to terminate 
employees who engage in discrimination. If the EEOC's nonacquiescence 
policy causes discrimination to be found by the agency when it would not be 
so found in the federal courts, because the agency is unable to obtain any 
judicial review of this decision, the result is that a federal employee will like-
ly be subjected to discipline up to and including termination under an inter-
pretation of the law not entitled to Chevron deference.221 
b. Contextual Concerns: Repeat Players and Lack of Policing 
Looking at the fmal set of considerations to evaluate the EEOC's non-
acquiescence policy, contextual considerations suggest that the policy is not 
217. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006), with 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-16 (2006). 
218. Pub. L. No.1 07 -174, 116 Stat. 566 (2002). 
219. ld. §§ 201, 203. 
220.Id. § 101. 
221. The potential impropriety of subjecting a person to sanctions for past behav-
ior, without warning, by a decision-maker other than a federal judge was noted by 
Cynthia Farina. See Farina, supra note 102, at 453. 
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justified. The specific concerns raised by the EEOC's policy include a poten-
tial repeat player problem and the lack of sufficient oversight over OFO. 
As to the repeat player phenomenon, while the individual employee sub-
ject to discrimination in the federal sector changes with each case, the em-
ploying agencies do not. There is such a limited number of agencies that the 
specter of special treatment for these repeat players must be considered as a 
factor suggesting that OFO is not particularly well placed to create its own 
interpretations of Title VII. This possibility is made more likely by the dual 
role of OFO vis-a-vis other federal agencies. OFO is not limited to acting as 
an adjudicator. Rather, OFO is also charged with assisting federal agencies in 
their efforts to comply with Title Vll.222 This puts OFO in the position of 
having to help agencies improve their anti-discrimination efforts while simul-
taneously judging how effective their anti-discrimination efforts are in any 
given case. If OFO has just been working with an agency to improve its res-
ponses to sexual harassment claims, it seems less likely that OFO is going to 
find that a response to sexual harassment by that agency is legally insuffi-
cient.223 
Compounding the repeat player concern and the problem raised by 
OFO's dual responsibilities toward the agencies is the factual reality that the 
EEOC is subject to political pressure even though it is nominally an indepen-
dent agency.224 Unlike federal court judges, the EEOC's employees deciding 
federal employee cases are not given life tenure. And, on a larger scale, the 
EEOC's budget is subject to pressure from both the Executive and Congress. 
These problems of political pressure225 and agencies as repeat players, when 
coupled with the lack of special expertise at the EEOC, suggest that the 
EEOC's nonacquiescence policy is inappropriate. 
In addition, one of the perpetual difficulties with the administrative law 
state, that of effectively policing an agency,226 is present for the EEOC. As to 
222. See Statement of Carlton Hadden, Director, Office of Federal Operations, 
Meeting on Federal Sector EEO Investigations (Sept. 7, 2006), available at http:// 
www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/meetings/9-7-06/hadden.html(last visited July 1,2008). 
223. This is a variation on the point that, when an agency is self-interested, it 
should be entitled to less deference in its interpretations of law. See Sunstein [Che-
vron], supra note 16, at 2076,2101 (discussing agency bias). 
224. The President selects the Chainnan of the Commission, for example. 29 
U.S.C. § 791(a) (2006). 
225. This point might strike some as inconsistent with one of the rationales for 
deferring to agency construction of a statute - that is, they are preferable policymak-
ers over federal judges because they have political accountability. However, the rela-
tive obscurity of OFO's office itself and even greater obscurity of its decisions sug-
gest that the normal political accountability of agencies is lacking here. 
226. The need for effective limitations on one branch of government by other 
branches dates back to the founding of this country. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 
(James Madison). Its ongoing importance is well recognized. See Sunstein [Che-
vron], supra note 16, at 2071; Diller & Morawetz, supra note 59, at 828 (noting im-
portance of judicial oversight of agencies); Coenen, supra note 61, at 1439 (discuss-
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OFO, the policing issue is particularly disturbing. In administrative adjudica-
tion, the normal manner of policing an agency is by giving federal courts the 
authority to review agency adjudicative decisions. 227 Facially, that seems to 
occur with regard to OFO's decisions. If dissatisfied, the employee claiming 
discrimination may bring suit in federal court and have his or her case heard 
de novo.228 While this seems to be a powerful policing tool, OFO has ne-
gated its power by refusing to be bound by federal circuit court decisions. By 
doing this, OFO has refused to allow itself to be policed. It is able to main-
tain its own body of law, and there is no mechanism through which its deci-
sions can be directly criticized. In essence, once a case goes to federal court, 
it is irrelevant to OFO what happens there. OFO never receives any commen-
tary on its interpretations of law in that case, and OFO refuses to be bound by 
. . fl . h 229 mterpretatIons 0 aw m ot er cases. 
4. Resolving the EEOC Problem 
It is unlikely that the EEOC will, of its own accord, change its practice 
and begin following federal courts of appeals decisions interpreting Title VII. 
The obvious solution to change the EEOC's current practice is via legislation. 
Congress could explicitly require the EEOC to follow federal courts of ap-
peals decisions interpreting Title VII. However, this solution brings with it 
other questions, such as whether the EEOC should follow one particular cir-
cuit or follow the circuit in which the employee is located. In addition, while 
it is proper and appropriate for there to be consistency between the law as 
interpreted by the EEOC and as in the federal courts, this solution would not 
address the problem of EEOC decisions being non-reviewable by the federal 
courts. Thus, even if the EEOC were purporting to follow federal court deci-
sions, policing the agency would be nearly impossible. 
A better solution would be to overhaul the procedural process. One of 
three approaches here would be more appropriate. The first and best solution 
would be to amend Title VII to remove the right to a trial de novo in the fed-
eral courts. Instead, federal employee cases would be reviewed in a manner 
similar to other agency actions. Cases would be reviewed on the administra-
tive record by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the employee 
ing importance of limiting authority of executive agencies); Farina, supra note 102, at 
493-95 (discussing the history and relevance to the deference debate). 
227. Richard Pierce has suggested that inappropriate agency action, specifically 
inconsistent interpretations of the law within the agency, is "easily detected" by re-
viewing courts and thus presumably not a significant concern. See Pierce, supra note 
100, at 2236. While this may be true in other contexts, the lack of substantive review 
ofOFO interpretations indicates otherwise here. 
228. See supra Part I. 
229. If OFO were to declare its decisions unreviewable generally, that position 
would be of highly suspect legality. See Sunstein [Chevron], supra note 16, at 2102. 
In essence, though, OFO has achieved that result through its nonacquiescence policy. 
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worked, and the review would be with deference to the agency's factual fmd-
ings and de novo as to the agency's legal conclusions. In addition to chang-
ing the manner of review, the agency itself should be given the right to seek 
review of the OFO decision to ensure appropriate policing of the EEOC. 
There are several benefits to this approach. First, it ensures parity be-
tween treatment of employees in the federal government and all other em-
ployees as to the substantive interpretations of anti-discrimination laws, as 
they would all be governed by the law as interpreted by the federal court of 
appeals for the circuit in which they work. Second, it reduces the number of 
cases in the federal district courts, since review will be at the court of appeals, 
not the district court. Third, it reduces the federal government's overall costs 
for handling these claims because employees would no longer have two full 
trials (one at the administrative and one at the district court level). Fourth, it 
increases the value of the administrative process, which is the sole place 
where a record is created. Fifth, it will ensure consistency as to the outcome 
of each individual case, as the source of interpretations of Title VII will be 
the same at both the administrative and federal court level. And finally, but 
perhaps most important, the federal courts of appeals will be in a position to 
police the decisions of the EEOC and OFO and curb arbitrary or capricious 
agency decisions.23o However, it will result in the loss of a trial de novo in 
federal district court, removing parity between federal and private sector em-
ployees as to that right. 
There are other options for solving the problem, but they are less desir-
able for various reasons. A variation on the first option would be to establish 
the Federal Circuit, or some other circuit, as the reviewing court for claims by 
federal employees. This is the system by which other non-discrimination 
employment claims of federal employees are handled.23I There are several 
benefits of this approach. First, it retains the uniformity oflaw for the EEOC, 
merely replacing OFO as the final arbiter of Title VII with one of the federal 
circuit courts. Second, it ensures that all federal employees are subject to the 
same interpretation of the law, regardless of where they work. Thus, em-
ployees of an agency with offices throughout the country will all be subject to 
the same body of law rather than subject to the body of law within federal 
circuits, which are based on geographic location. Third, the Federal Circuit is 
currently charged with handling other federal employment claims involving 
the merit system. As a consequence, it has familiarity with the mechanics of 
agency employment decision-making, which is a complex matter at the heart 
of most employment discrimination claims. 
230. Another benefit of this approach is the potential benefit to the individuals 
accused of engaging in discrimination. At present, if OFO determines that discrimi-
nation has occurred, the alleged discriminator has no way of seeking review of that 
decision because the agency-employer is bound by the decision. The alleged discri-
minator will then be subject to disciplinary action. 
231. See 5 U.S.c. § 7703(b)(I) (2006) (petition for review of MSPB decisions 
must be filed in the Federal Circuit). 
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There are, however, negative consequences to this approach that offset 
these benefits and make this option less attractive than the first. One down-
side is that absolute parity between private and federal employees is lost. 
Another negative repercussion of this approach is that it would involve a 
large increase in the Federal Circuit's docket, because it currently does not 
handle employment discrimination claims at all.232 And finally, because the 
Federal Circuit currently does not handle employment discrimination claims, 
it lacks knowledge and expertise on the topic as compared with the other fed-
eral courts of appeals. 
A more radical approach than those proposed above would be to over-
haul the current system by removing the current complex administrative pro-
cedures and instead have federal employee claims handled in a manner simi-
lar to those of private sector employees. For private sector employees, the 
EEOC does process claims, but it does not conduct trial-like hearings or ap-
peals. Instead, the EEOC investigates some claims, mediates some claims, 
engages in conciliation efforts on some claims, and litigates strategic cases.233 
A significant number of claims are not investigated or otherwise handled by 
the EEOC at all; individual litigants opt out of the process and seek relief 
directly in federal COurt.234 In this option, OFO and administrative judges 
would not adjudicate cases, and, thus, there would be no reliance on the OFO-
developed body of case law. The benefits of such an approach for the EEOC 
itself are significant. Instead of managing two entirely distinct systems of 
handling claims, the EEOC would be able to streamline its processes by hav-
ing a single system for both private and federal sector employees. This would 
decrease costs for the EEOC, as the EEOC would no longer be required to 
field administrative judges to hear federal employee claims at a hearing nor 
review those cases again on appeal. Instead, the agency would be able to 
manage cases in the federal sector in the same manner that it does in the pri-
vate sector - by directing the agency's limited resources toward the most 
meritorious and strategically important cases. In addition, the federal agen-
cies would save significantly, as the current cumbersome administrative 
process would be shortened. 
This option would require congressional involvement, and the EEOC 
would need to promulgate new procedural regulations to change the adminis-
232. As the federal courts currently handle cases from federal employees in their 
circuit who opt out of or are unsatisfied with the administrative process, the increase 
in case load for the federal circuits would have less of an impact on the circuit courts 
than consolidation into one court would have on that court's docket. 
233. See EEOC's Charge Processing Procedures, http://eeoc.gov/charge/over 
view_charge yrocessing.html (last visited July 2, 2008) (EEOC website describing 
the manner in which the agency processes discrimination complaints for private sector 
employees). 
234. See Paul Igasaki, Doing the Best with What We Had: Building a More Effec-
tive Equal Employment Opportunity Commission During the Clinton-Gore Adminis-
tration, 17 LAB. LAW. 261,266 (2001). 
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trative process. It would also require that the EEOC, agencies, and federal 
employees accept a radically different approach than is currently used, which 
seems unlikely and makes this a less viable option than the others. Also, 
many federal employees are likely to protest this approach because of the 
increased difficulty of bringing a complaint to a hearing, as the federal courts 
will not likely be as accessible to them as was the EEOC.235 These practical 
difficulties make this option less viable than the other options. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The current system, with the EEOC asserting a right to ignore federal 
court of appeals decisions, is fundamentally flawed. Perhaps most disturbing-
ly, it results in two separate bodies of law without a direct mechanism for 
reconciling them. It also decreases the value of the administrative process 
because, at the end of the day, the entire administrative process is meaning-
less if the employee does not like the outcome and sues in federal court. Fur-
ther, it increases costs by allowing duplicative trials, one in the administrative 
process and one in federal court. And all of the negative repercussions result 
from the EEOC's assertion of power that is contrary to Chevron and its prog-
eny as well as inconsistent with underlying constitutional and administrative 
law principles and theories. For these reasons, the EEOC's nonaquiescence 
practice must be halted. 
235. The plaintiffs' bar is also likely to be unenthusiastic about this approach. 
There is a small but devoted group of attorneys who rely on federal employee claims 
as a significant portion of their practice, and they are unlikely to view the replacement 
of administrative judges with district court judges as a benefit to them or their clients. 
